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Attack:
Lake Champlain I




-Lake Champlain:-

Attack:

“. . . the Key of this extensive country . . .”

Fort Ticonderoga




1. The River Road to War in 1775


In early 1609 the great French discoverer, Samuel de Champlain, pushing south from the budding French settlements in the St. Lawrence River valley, discovered a great lake, running from north to south, which he named after himself as Lake Champlain. In a short period, during which he got himself involved in an intra-Indian war, Champlain got as far south as the modern Ticonderoga. Not long after the Dutch navigator, Henry Hudson, discovered a great river, running due north and named after him Hudson River. In September 1609 Hudson sailed as far north as the modern Albany. Within a few months of one another the two explorers had discovered each end of an historic water route between the Hudson and St. Lawrence Rivers.


For the next century and a half the forces of two empires, the French based in Canada, and the English (who superseded the Dutch), based in New York, collided along the Lake Champlain axis. Forces from each side tried to penetrate into the other’s territory, sometimes successfully, sometimes not. Forts were built, abandoned, besieged, rebuilt, and conquered. Fleets clashed on the lakes and rivers. But all centered along the line Hudson-Champlain-St. Lawrence. Finally, in the last duel for empire, the French and Indian War of 1756-1763, the English conquered Canada and expelled the French from the continent of North America. With both ends of the waterway held by the same power, the lake area became a backwater.


The trip to Quebec (or Canada) north began at Albany, New York. Founded as Fort Orange by the Dutch in 1613 as a trading post for the fur trade with the Indians of the upper Hudson valley. Fort Orange passed to the English in 1664, back to the Dutch in 1673, and permanently to the English in 1675. The place, renamed Albany, grew to be the second city in the English colony of New York, but retained its Dutch heritage and settlers. For any military force moving south from the valley of the St. Lawrence, Albany was the ultimate objective. In the other direction, Albany was always the rear base and assembly point for any force moving north.


Albany was the northern terminus of navigation on the Hudson River. Below Albany lay all of New York, distributed along that great thoroughfare. The Hudson was thus a highway out of the interior of New York, and a highway into the interior from New York. British forces in control and occupation of the Hudson River would effectively sever the rebellious colonies, including the soul of the rebellion, New England, from the more southern colonies. However the highway did not stop there.


From Albany the Hudson ran due north for forty miles, but was only partially navigable. Two roads ran north from Albany, one on each bank of the Hudson. The road on the west bank was close to the river, and interrupted by numerous small streams feeding into the river, the largest being the Mohawk River. This road ran for forty miles, ending across the Hudson from Fort Edward. En route the road passed through Stillwater (near abandoned Fort Winslow), Saratoga (across the Fish Kill from old Fort Hardy), and Fort Miller. All these posts were relics from the late war, abandoned and rotting. On the east bank the road swung far inland, passing through no settlement, and was considered unsafe and usually ignored.


In the vicinity of Fort Edward were the Hudson Falls, where the Hudson turned west. From here it was only a few miles to the southern end of Lake George or to the South Bay of Lake Champlain. At this point on the Hudson River was the site of Fort Edward, an abandoned fortification from the French and Indian Warn War. It was the southern anchor of a short road north. The road ran north for three miles to a place called Kingsbury, then split. One road ran northeasterly for seven miles to Fort Anne, which lay on Wood Creek. The other branch ran northwesterly six miles to Fort Amherst, then three miles further to Fort George, which lay at the southern end of Lake George.


Fort Anne, abandoned in 1775, lay on Wood Creek. Wood Creek fed into the South River, which became the South Bay of Lake Champlain. Seven to twelve miles of “rugged wilderness road” north of Fort Anne was Skenesborough.


Skenesborough was the heart of Major Philip Skene’s 60000 acre wilderness empire and embryo government. Skene had served in the late war and been granted a 25000 acre tract around the South Bay area. A settlement with sawmills, settlers, and a manor house followed. Skene was known as Lieutenant Governor of the area. In 1775 he was in England, trying to get the Crown to create the area its own government with himself as head. From Skenesborough the winding lake led to Fort Ticonderoga, twenty-one miles away.


Fort William Henry was built at the southern tip of Lake George beginning in 1755. The place was begun following Sir William Johnson’s victory of the French general Dieskieu in 1755. It was besieged by Montcalm from 4 August 1757 to 9 August, when its garrison of 2200 men under Lt. Col. George Munro surrendered. The Indians began massacring the prisoners and Munro reached Fort Edward with 1400 survivors.


Fort George was built about a mile southeast of Fort William Henry (which Montcalm destroyed). It was the northern anchor of a ten mile road to Fort Edward on the Hudson. It was in a “very declining condition” in February 1767. In early 1775 it was “garrisoned” only with a caretaker, Captain John Nordberg.


Lake George was the first of the major bodies of water encountered. It is thirty-five miles long, and varies between one and three miles wide. There are many small islands in the lake, which empties at its northern end into Lake Champlain. Since Lake George is 240 feet higher than Lake Champlain, this passageway is full of rocks, rapids, and falls. There was a three mile portage around this portion which came out on Lake Champlain at Fort Ticonderoga. In 1775 there was a small area of settlement around Sabbath Day Point.


Modern aerial view of Fort Ticonderoga. It didn’t look this good in 1775, but was potentially just as strong.


Both these routes, Hudson-Lake George and Hudson-Wood Creek-South Bay, converged at Fort Ticonderoga. This place  was first fortified by the French to be an outpost for their works at Crown Point. The site was the point from which both routes from Albany met, and was situated at one of the narrowest points of Lake Champlain.


Lake George emptied into Lake Champlain through a narrow, rock, gorge, dropping nearly two hundred feet in the process. On a headland near the junction was located Fort Ticonderoga, the linchpin of the southern defenses of the lake country. Ticonderoga had been the scene of much fighting in the late war, but was now used only as a supply depot, being garrisoned with a small force of forty-nine men under a Captain William Delaplace. There were twenty-four dependents also living there.


This old map of the area around Fort Ticonderoga shows clearly the strategic importance of the place: the junction of Lake George, the narrowness of Lake Champlain, and Mounts Defiance and Mount Independence (not named that in 1775 of course).


A few settlers had arrived on the area around Fort Ticonderoga by 1775. After the last war three brothers, the Stougthons, from Connecticut, had received a 2000 acre grant and established a lumber business at the north end of Lake George and in the Fort Ticonderoga area.


Crown Point was the next fortified place down the lake from Fort Ticonderoga. It was located about ten miles north on a narrow peninsula, averaging about a mile in width; the peninsula closing the lake down to a width of only half a mile. The peninsula was composed of a dark limestone, only slightly covered with earth. The rock made any attempt upon a fortification built there a matter of assault, for the rock prevented the digging of parallels. The place was the site of a battle between the French and Iroquois in 1609. Later, both Dutch and English traders established a trading post on the peninsula. The French erected a strong fort there in 1731, called Fort St. Frederic; which, however, was built close to the shore, thus giving up the high ground. Colonial and English expeditions in 1755 and 1756 failed to capture the post. On the approach of the English in 1759 the French abandoned the fort, retreating down the lake, and blowing up the fortifications.


Area around Crown Point, illustrating the narrow lake access.


The British founded a new fort, Crown Point, two hundred yards to the north and on higher ground. They laid out a pentagonal post with five bastions, rampart walls twenty-five feet wide and nearly as high, three barracks, and a well inside the fort. Crown Point served as a forward base from 1759 to 1761 during operations against the French. About $10,000,000 was spent on the fort, which was not completed when the war ended. It was a mere staging point in 1775, garrisoned by nine men and a sergeant. There was a snug anchorage nearby. It was the last point before the lake widened.


Directly opposite was a place variously called Chimney Point or Windmill Point, now in Vermont. The French had settled there in 1731, before building Fort St. Frederic, erecting a stone windmill, which was used as a fortification in the colonial wars. In 1749 the windmill mounted six guns. This point took it’s name from the abandoned mill or from the abandoned chimneys of the French settlers’ homes.


To the north of Crown Point lay Lake Champlain, which led up to Canada, and the great valley of the St. Lawrence River, the fundamental settlement area of the recently conquered Quebec. For nearly one hundred years the French and the English had dueled for mastery of the North American continent and the line of contact, as well as the only secure line of communication, lay along the waterways: Hudson River-Lake George-Lake Champlain-Richelieu River-St. Lawrence River. After the French surrender, this area, formerly full of fortifications, was allowed to decay and became a semi-abandoned backwater. Nevertheless, a century of listening for war whoops in the night led the colonists to remember the backwater. Should war come and Canada remain loyal, then this backwater would again be the front line.


Lake Champlain from Fort St. Johns to Fort Ticonderoga


The waterways to the south of Fort Ticonderoga.


The entire Lake Champlain area was a vast stretch of woodland, interrupted only very seldom by small settlements or single farms. It had none of that perquisite of civilization, the road. This absence of roads was the single over-riding factor in movement in the area, shaping the policy and strategy, and sometimes even the tactics of any military force.


Lake Champlain was 125 miles long from Missiquoi Bay and the mouth of the Richelieu River in the north to South Bay, near Skenesborough, in the south. It varied in width from 400 yards to fourteen miles wide. There were several large islands (Grand Isle, Isle la Motte, Valcour Island) and many small ones. There were few inhabitants along the shores, but there were some, mostly French.


During the years of peace several settlements were budding on the lake. Besides the Stoughtons and Skene other settlements had been established. William Gilliland began a settlement in 1765 near Willsboro along the Bouquet River. In 1766 Captain Charles de Fredenburgh started a settlement on the outlet of the Saranac River (now Plattsburgh) and soon acquired 30000 acres from the Crown. Other settled areas were Crown Point, Port Henry, and Panton. From New Hampshire the Allen brothers (Ethan and Ira) managed to acquire land titles to 12000 acres, eventually rising to 60000 including land on the Onion River.


At the northern end the lake emptied into the Richelieu River (also known as the Sorel or the Chambly), which widened at this point. There was a large island, Isle aux Noix, located in the Richelieu here, which nearly blocked it. A mile or two further north was Fort St. Johns Here was a garrison and a small shipyard and the base of the only naval force on the lake, a vessel of the Quebec Provincial Marine, which some times patrolled the lake. The Richelieu (or Sorel) River ran north from Fort St. Johns, all the way to Sorel on the St. Lawrence River, but ten miles of vicious rapids between Fort St. Johns and Chambly made it unnavigable. A road ran northwest from Fort St. Johns toward Montreal. Fort St. Johns, then, was the key to an advance from the south.


2. American Reconnaissance, February-March 1775


The Americans, nervously but steadily moving toward rebellion against the mother country, had long been concerned with Canada. As early as 26 October 1774 the First Continental Congress had voted an address to the Canadians, urging them to join their fellow colonials in common cause.1


As the new year came and tension increased, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, now actively planning for hostilities, took steps to gain intelligence from the northern colony.2 In early 1775, one John Brown, a 31-year old member of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress from Pittsfield, graduate of Yale in 1771, and sometime King’s Attorney in the Mohawk territory of Sir William Johnson, was asked to go on a mission by the Congress. Brown had settled in Pittsfield in 1773 and became active in Whig politics.3 Brown was to go into Canada, examine the defenses, and sound out pro-American sentiment among the different classes of Canadians.4


Brown and two companions set out in mid-winter 1775, February. They traveled by way of Albany and Lake Champlain to Montreal in the dead of winter, under the cover of horse-buyers. It was a terrible trip: at one point Brown’s boat was frozen in the ice beside an island in Lake Champlain for two days. The trio came to the posts on the lakes: formidable looking Fort Ticonderoga, nearly abandoned Crown Point, Fort St. Johns, and Fort Chambly, above Fort St. Johns on the Richelieu River. At each one guns and garrisons were noted. On the way, Brown contacted the scattering of settlers in the New Hampshire Grants (now Vermont), where a local militia organization, the Green Mountain Boys, had sprung up in a squabble with New York over land holdings. The leader of the Green Mountain Boys was one Ethan Allen, a name to remember.


At Montreal, Brown contacted several “old subjects” who assured him of their support (some at Quebec, some in the Richelieu River area, and many at Montreal). Chief among these was Thomas Walker, a former Boston merchant. Brown requested Walker to organize and chair a Canadian Committee of Safety, to bring the province of Quebec into line with the other rebellious colonies. Although Walker agreed, Brown thought and reported that sentiment in class-conscious Quebec was not strong in favor of the Americans.5 However, Brown thought that the British could not depend on the “new subjects” (the French-speaking habitants), nor the Indians.6


As Brown discovered on his mission the British were holding the lakes (George and Champlain)  with an unbelievably small force. From Albany on the Hudson River (where there was no garrison) a short road led to Lake George, terminating in an abandoned Fort George. There was no garrison here and there was no naval force on the lake. Proceeding up Lake George led to the “Gibralter of America,” the great Vauban-type fortress of Fort Ticonderoga, which guarded the strategic point where Lake George met Lake Champlain. This great fortress had a garrison of eighty or so men and was exceedingly run down. Twelve miles to the north there was another small post at Crown Point, with about twelve men. At the northern end of Lake Champlain there was a small garrison Fort St. Johns, guarding the mouth of the Richelieu River. The only naval force on the lake was, presumably, part of the Quebec Provincial Marine, a 70-ton sloop built in 1771, and armed with two guns and six swivels named the Betsey7 (or George or George III).


In addition Skenesborough must be considered a military post. Here were located four brass cannon for protection of the settlement and a small schooner, called the Catherine or Katherine. As has been said Skene was away in England in early 1775.


3. American Plans, February-9 May 1775


Lawyer and secret agent Brown was back by 29 March 1775, when he rendered his report to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress. Brown reported that Quebec would probably not send delegates to the Continental Congress, although there were rebel sympathizers among the merchants in the country. Brown suggested the capture of Fort Ticonderoga at the outbreak of the war. He had arranged with the people of the New Hampshire Grants [Vermont] to do the job.8


The benefits of such an attack were obvious. The seizure of Fort Ticonderoga and its satellite at Crown Point would open the communication channel to Montreal if an American expedition was set in hand. Before Brown left Montreal he had installed a clandestine communications net for the Americans.9 The American possession of the fort would also block any British moves from the north. In addition there were large numbers of cannon at Fort Ticonderoga.


If the British were unprepared for forthcoming events, they were not totally unexpected. Governor Sir Guy Carleton of Quebec had three regiments of infantry and three companies of artillery to defend the colony in the spring of 1775. One regiment, the 8th Foot, and one company of artillery, was stationed in the Great Lakes area (Detroit and Niagara), the 7th Foot was at Montreal and the 26th Foot at Quebec.10 As early as 8 March, General Gage had warned Captain William De la Place, commander at Fort Ticonderoga, to guard against a surprise attack.11


On 19 April 1775 the long expected hostilities began at Lexington and Concord. Gage took the time from a hectic day to write a letter to Carleton, requesting that Carleton send the 7th Regiment from Montreal to Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point.12 Carleton only received this letter after it was far too late.


 
 

Ethan Allen, leader of the Green Mountain Boys.

Many Americans immediately thought of Fort Ticonderoga. Benedict Arnold, a Captain of Connecticut Militia, who was en route to Cambridge with his company, met Colonel Samuel Holden Parsons on the road home from Boston to recruit. Arnold was then aged34, a merchant and shipowner and master residing in New Haven. Arnold was 5'9" tall, thickset and very strong with unusual stamina. Arnold had ice-grey eyes, dark hair and a swarthy complexion. He fully supported the American position in the unrest preceding the war and was elected captain of his militia company in December 1774.13 Parsons and Arnold began discussing the situation at Boston. Parsons lamented the lack of cannon in Ward’s army at Boston. Arnold told Parsons there were plenty at Fort Ticonderoga.14 More discussion, concerning the fort’s capture, followed, and then the two went their separate ways.15


On 28 April, a number of members of the Connecticut Assembly conversed on a scheme to relieve Boston by capturing Fort Ticonderoga to secure its cannon. Parsons was present at this meeting.16 Others present, either at this meeting or one held the next day, included Governor Jonathan Trumbull and his Council, and the Massachusetts delegates to the Continental Congress, John Hancock and John Adams. John Brown may have been present.17 Edward Mott told them that a few men might take the place if the effort were properly conducted.18 A plan was proposed for the capture of Fort Ticonderoga by a small force from Connecticut assisted by Colonel Ethan Allen’s Green Mountain Boys.19 The men desired Mott to join Noah Phelps of Simsbury, Bernard Romans, and a Major Halsed20 in the scheme and furnished £300 in cash for the expedition.21 An express was sent to Bennington to request Ethan Allen to collect the Green Mountain Boys.22 Phelps and Romans went in advance on the 28th.23 Parsons24 recruited sixteen men who departed on 29 April for Pittsfield, Massachusetts,25 with Epaphras Bull and Mott.26 At Pittsfield forty more men and John Brown were enlisted.27 Bernard Romans seems to have been given orders to take charge of this expedition, but his authority was universally ignored.28


Meanwhile, Captain Arnold had arrived at Cambridge and managed to obtain a meeting with the Massachusetts Committee of Safety on 30 April. Arnold told the committee that one hundred cannon and ten to twelve mortars were at Fort Ticonderoga, three or four cannon at Skenesborough, that the garrison was 40-45 men, that the fort was in a “ruinous condition,” and that the British naval force on the lake was a schooner of 70 or 80 tons.29 Arnold’s opinion was that the fort “could not hold out an hour against a vigorous onset.”30 All this, and more, the Committee should have known from lawyer Brown’s March report.


On 2 May the Massachusetts Committee of Safety sent a subcommittee to confer with Major General Artemus Ward, the chief Massachusetts officer and effective Commander-in-Chief at the siege of Boston. The purpose was to confer on Arnold’s “proposal” for an assault on Fort Ticonderoga.31 The subcommittee reported back in the afternoon, favorably. The Committee of Safety agreed to furnish Arnold with £100, two hundred pounds of gunpowder, lead ball, flint and ten horses. He was appointed to a “secret service,” as a Colonel, empowered to appoint two Captains, and enlist privates, all to serve until dismissed.32


A day earlier, in Pittsfield,33 James Easton, John Brown, and Edward Mott and their men had conferred. Mott proposed to raise men in the New Hampshire Grants to keep secrecy and avoid a long march. Brown and Easton agreed to join. Brown offered to raise men from his own regiment to join with the Green Mountain Boys. Easton and Mott went to Jericho to recruit, and raised between forty and fifty men.34 The expedition was soon ready to proceed to Bennington,35 departing on 2 May. Colonel Easton, Captain Israel Dickinson, John Brown, and nearly forty soldiers left on the mission.36 Easton, Mott and Brown soon parted from their troops, traveling ahead.37


Arnold received his official orders on 3 May. He was to enlist up to 400 men, seize Fort Ticonderoga, garrison the place and remove the excess cannon to Boston.38 He immediately began recruiting. Some of Arnold’s men, under Captain John Pout Sloan, entered pay as from 3 May 1775.39 Captain Samuel Herrick’s company was shown as in pay from 3 May;40 however, Herrick’s men clearly joined Arnold at a later date.


Benedict Arnold in 1776. The legend says “Colonel Arnold who commanded the Provincial Troops sent against Quebec, through the wilderness of Canada and was wounded in that city, under General Montgomery.” By Thomas Hart.


The day that Arnold began recruiting, Easton’s recruits arrived at Bennington. The next day a council of war was held with Colonel Easton as chairman. A plan of advance operations was drawn up: Allen was to send parties to secure the roads to prevent advance notice to the British.41


It was now that New York, within whose territory lay Fort Ticonderoga, first learned of the proposed strike. The Committee of the City of Albany received, on 3 May, a request to supply provisions to the Connecticut-Massachusetts troops. The Albany Committee referred to the Committee of One Hundred of New York for instructions.42


On 7 May Allen, Easton, and Brown arrived at Castleton. On 9 May a Committee of War was chosen, with Mott as chairman. A plan was drawn up: Captain Samuel Herrick should proceed to Skenesborough on the afternoon of the 8th, capture Major Philip Skene, seize all possible boats and proceed down the lake to Shoreham in the night. The remainder of the men (140), under Colonel Ethan Allen, Colonel James Easton and Captain Seth Warner, in order, were to meet there. Captain Asa Douglass (of Jericho) was sent to Panton to seek boats from his brother-in-law who lived there.43 Riders were sent out to screen the roads around the fort and collect more recruits.44 The men prepared to march, being nine miles from Skenesborough and twenty-five from Fort Ticonderoga.45 Allen was not present, having gone ahead two miles to Shoreham (Orwell) where the forces were to assemble in Hand’s Cove.46


Arnold, meanwhile, was recruiting at Stockbridge, where he learned of the second expedition on 6 May.47 He immediately set out to overtake the Connecticut-Massachusetts-Vermont troops. He arrived at Castleton in the middle of the council of war. The committee was delighted to see that the Massachusetts Committee of Safety approved the task undertaken, less so when Arnold positively demanded command. The soldiers refused to be under Arnold’s command, and nearly mutinied.48 Arnold maintained that he was the only one legally authorized to take the fort.49 After a good deal of heated discussion, the men set out for Shoreham, to let Allen and Arnold argue it out there.


Late on the 9th, Allen and about 230 men arrived on the opposite shore from Fort Ticonderoga, by forced march from Bennington.50 Arnold thought there were only about 150 men: 100 Green Mountain Boys and fifty “veteran soldiers” from Massachusetts under Easton.51 After another strenuous round of arguments Arnold got permission to march at the head of the troops, even if not the joint command he later claimed.52


2. Fort Ticonderoga, 10 May 1775


Some 200 men were now assembled in the predawn at Hand’s Cove, Easton’s and Allen’s men. The fort was two miles away over the water. The moon was down, and the sun not up, and the wind was kicking up, laced with rain squalls. No boats had yet appeared. Near dawn a large oared boat was brought by two boys and soon after Douglass brought another, with a few men.53


Dawn was nearly at hand; time for only one trip. Allen got 83 men across, and sent the boats back for the others (commanded by Colonel Seth Warner).54 The men landed a half mile below the fort as daybreak was coming. Allen lined up his men and addressed them.55 They then pushed through the main gate. A sentry’s musket misfired and he ran into the fort, a second sentry fired slightly wounding an officer. Allen hit him with the flat of his sword and ordered him to guide Allen to the officers’ quarters. The men drew up in parallel lines, back to back. After a few moments discussion De la Place surrendered.56 Arnold notes the fort was captured about 0400.57 Fifty prisoners were captured, plus twenty-four women and children.58


Interpretation of Allen demanding the surrender of Fort Ticonderoga.


The boats continued to bring men over during the day. Colonel Warner arrived in the early morning with 100 men and was ordered up to Crown Point59 with fifty men in boats to seize that post. Arnold wanted to follow with another fifty, to attempt the capture of the sloop.60 This attempted re-assertion of Arnold’s command provoked another disagreement.


The men from Connecticut invoked the “Committee of War” again. The Committee of War gave Allen orders to take command of the fort, after Arnold had reasserted his right to command. Arnold’s men had still not arrived.61 The Committee of War then dashed off a letter to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, complaining about Arnold: he refused to give up his command, but had not one man. The Committee of War was meanwhile raising men and supplies to repair the fort and capture the armed sloop.62 Allen “positively insisted” that Arnold have no command. Meanwhile the unruly members of the Green Mountain Boys plundered and looted, in “confusion and anarchy” according to Arnold.63


If Arnold had no men, he knew they were coming. On the 10th, just after the fort’s capture, he agreed with one J. Sparding, the ferryman on Lake George and the landing place, to furnish a boat and assistance in hauling baggage and supplies for 20s per day.64


The next day Arnold learned that the Crown Point party had turned back because of head winds and a storm. He also learned that the proposed attempt to capture the six-gun sloop (Betsey) had also been aborted. Arnold, left out and his pride pricked, reported to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety that he was ignored, that there was no regularity or order in the troops, and that many of Allen’s men must soon return home. It was more than he could bear, this being ignored. He asked the Committee of Safety to send more troops and a new commander for Fort Ticonderoga, but he reported, he was determined to stay until relieved.65 This letter of Arnold’s went out with a report from Allen to the Massachusetts authorities. Arnold’s name was conspicuously absent and Allen gave his praise to Easton and Brown. Allen requested Massachusetts to give aid to Connecticut in establishing a garrison at Fort Ticonderoga.66 Allen then turned to New York. In a letter to the Committee of Albany he requested assistance in holding Fort Ticonderoga: he wanted five hundred men and supplies. Allen warned that Carleton would “exert” himself to recapture the fort.67


On the morning of 11 May, Captain Samuel Herrick’s men arrived in Skenesborough and easily captured the place, along with Major Philip Skene’s property, family, and schooner.68 Many of Arnold’s men were with Herrick’s party and he later enlisted in Arnold’s regiment, receiving pay from 3 May.69


 

A contemporary drawing (1776) of the Liberty. From the Pell print.

 
The schooner was the most important of the fruits of the capture of Skenesborough. Captain Eleazer Oswald, a former merchant skipper and later Arnold’s military secretary,70 took charge of the schooner. She was renamed the Liberty, and Oswald prepared to sail her up to Fort Ticonderoga.71 Skene’s vessel was soon after referred to as a “snow,” or “an armed vessel, and of some consequence on the lake.”72 The small73 schooner Liberty had been built in 1774, and was forty-one feet in length on the deck, with a length on the keel of thirty-one feet, a beam of fourteen feet nine inches, and a depth in the hold of three feet one inch. She measured 40 tons.74 Her original name seems to have the Katherine (or Catherine). She was a rather flat-floored schooner, the shallow draft being suitable for sailing on Lake Champlain. She may have had some carvings and a figurehead. She was rigged as a ketch, fore and aft, with one square yard on the foremast and no topsail.75 During her refit in May and June 1776 she was painted red, or barn color.76 Liberty demonstrated rather poor sailing qualities in beating to windward.77 Oswald departed from Skenesborough in the Liberty on 11 May.78


While Arnold’s men were securing Skenesborough, Crown Point was being attended to. The original force dispatched on the 10th had been driven back by headwinds. A second attempt was made on the 11th, this time by land. On the afternoon of the 11th the place was captured, with eleven prisoners,79 and ten women and children.80 This was none too soon, for the British soldiers there had already heard of the events at Fort Ticonderoga and sent off boats with messengers to Fort St. Johns.81 On the day that Allen captured Fort Ticonderoga he sent a message to Captain Remember Baker to join him. Baker was coming up the lake from the Winooski River when he met two small boats with British soldiers, heading for Fort St. Johns with the report of Fort Ticonderoga’s capture and a request for reinforcements for Crown Point. Baker took the boats and arrived at Crown Point in time to assist Warner in its capture.82


While Crown Point and Skenesborough were being occupied, Captain Bernard Romans of Connecticut, whose orders from Connecticut were ignored in the Allen-Arnold tumult, proceeded to the south end of Lake George. Here he “captured” Fort George from its aged caretaker, Captain John Nordberg.83


The assumed capture of the schooner put Allen back in the mood to attempt further conquests. In a letter dated 12 May he notified Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut of the capture of Fort Ticonderoga. He noted a “Major” captured, referring to Philip Skene, a captain and two lieutenants. Skene was however, not captured, and Allen’s report seems based on assumption that things were going as planned. Allen expected to have the schooner rigged and armed in ten days, with six or eight cannon. With the schooner and other boats Allen proposed to attack the armed sloop, about twice the size of the schooner. Allen noted the commander of the sloop was a “man of Courage.” Allen “Conclude” that Warner had captured Crown Point by now (he did not know it seems), and that Carleton would counterattack. Allen sent Benjamin Hickok, Jeremiah Halsey and Moses Nichols down with the prisoners, recommending them to the Governor.84


While Allen was seeking help from Massachusetts and Connecticut, the New Yorkers hardly knew what to do. The Committee of the City of Albany received Allen’s letter announcing the capture of Fort Ticonderoga on 12 May. John Brown brought the letter, made the demands for assistance, and stated that prisoners were on the way. He was told that the Committee would send for instructions. Brown, dissatisfied, left abruptly.  The Albany men were concerned that war would now descend on northern New York. Instructions were asked for from the New York Committee of One Hundred at New York, and Captain Barent Ten Eyck was sent to request an answer. Previously Colonel Philip Schuyler had been sent for directions.85


The American attack on Lake Champlain May 1775.


By 13 May these requests for help were bearing fruit. A letter from Bernard Romans arrived in Hartford that day, stating that the garrison was weak in men and provisions, and requesting assistance in money and men. At the same time Governor Trumbull received the letter from Allen with the same requests. The patriots “rallied,” and sent Colonel Charles Webb, Colonel Joshua Porter, and Barnabas Deane, with £500, accompanied by “Eight marines from this Town well Spirited & equipped.” The men were ordered to go to Albany first, secure what help they could, and then proceed to Fort Ticonderoga.86


Meanwhile, schooner Liberty arrived at Fort Ticonderoga on the afternoon of 14 May,87 and with her came Arnold’s men. Here were Captains Eleazer Oswald, Jonathan Brown, and John Prout Sloan,88 with fifty of Arnold’s men “inlisted on the Road.”89 This put an altogether different attitude into Arnold: here was a schooner, controlled by his own men. Allen, who knew nought about sailing, could not command these troops, nor the schooner. Arnold appointed Sloan as Captain of the Liberty and Oswald as Captain of Marines.90


This tiny schooner became the first designated warship in the rebellion. It’s a little difficult to say what service she was in. Arnold held a Massachusetts commission, but Liberty has never been considered a Massachusetts Navy vessel. She cannot be called a Continental Army vessel at this point, as that service was created just over a month later. Nevertheless, she is usually referred to as part of the Continental Army’s Lake Champlain squadron, as indeed she later was.


Arnold received an intelligence report about 14 May. The armed sloop Betsey was at Fort St. John, provisioning and awaiting a fair wind to sail to Fort Ticonderoga.91 Arnold was preparing to embark his fifty men92 in the Liberty and a bateau and go after the Betsey.93


In the matter of command, Arnold was beginning to have his own way. He reported (14 May) that one hundred of his men had arrived, that Allen’s men were daily departing and the dispute consequently subsiding. Arnold reported that he and Bernard Romans were preparing at Fort George to transport the captured cannon to Boston. Arnold recommended Bernard Romans as very helpful, and asked for another officer to relieve him. Romans had gone to Albany to forward provisions and provide gun carriages.94 This letter was sent by Romans, going by way of New Haven.95


3. Fort St. Johns, 15-20 May 1775


Arnold boarded the Liberty and she sailed soon after for Crown Point.96 But adverse winds slowed her down, and Arnold and most of his men pushed ahead to Crown Point. Liberty finally arrived at Crown Point in the evening of 15 May.97 Arnold and his soldiers embarked and sailed at once. But the contrary winds still delayed Liberty’s voyage to Fort St. Johns. Arnold loaded the bateau with thirty men and set out for Fort St. Johns, leaving Sloan and Oswald to follow.


At 1200 a boat was seen and Liberty sent her coxswain to bring her in. She was a post boat from Montreal with an ensign aboard. On examining the mail, Sloan and Oswald made an astounding discovery: they had found the British order of battle for the whole northern department: only 700 soldiers held all Canada.98


The wind turned on the 17th, a “fair gale” said Oswald, and Liberty soon caught up with Arnold and took him and his men aboard. The Americans were thirty miles99 above Fort St, Johns at night fall,100 (1800101 or 2000102) when the wind died off.103 The Americans armed and manned two bateaux with thirty-five men and started rowing.104


The American raiding party arrived within half a mile of Fort St. Johns105 at 0600,106 sunrise, and put into a small mosquito-infested creek, while a man was sent out to gather information. Soon the man returned with the good news: their arrival was unexpected. The Americans pushed out and landed about sixty rods from the barracks, formed up and marched toward them.107 The small British force, thirteen108 or fourteen men, formed up and acted as if to fight. When the Americans got close they threw down their arms and retreated into the barracks.109 Oswald was now sent to capture the Betsey,110 anchored two miles below the fort, with her bows upstream; her crew fast asleep.111


Titled "Operations on Lake Champlain May 1775." Photograph of a watercolor by C. T. Warren or A. W. Warren, painted in the early nineteenth century. It depicts the American boats advancing up the Richelieu River. From the Bailry Collection, published in Naval Actions of the American Revolution.


The armed sloop with her crew of six112 or seven men,113 two field pieces and four or five114 boats were captured. Five more boats were destroyed. Just as the business was finished a north wind blew up and the Americans sailed away,115 within two hours of landing.116 Betsey’s ensign was run up, upside down however, as a token of new ownership.117


The sloop was a most valuable acquisition. She was 70 tons, armed with two 6-pounders. She represented the only other naval force on the lake besides the Liberty. In possession of both these tiny warships, the Americans ruled the lake.118 The prisoners were variously numbered: a sergeant and twelve men,119 or fourteen men.120


Meanwhile Allen had been reflecting on the quest for the sloop Betsey. He decided there was room enough for two heroes. Allen got four boats and loaded between eighty121 and one hundred and fifty men in them, and set out (about 16 May) for Fort St. Johns, to reinforce and hold the fort. He unfortunately, in his haste, neglected to ship provisions for his soldiers.122 Allen picked up twenty more men soon after leaving Fort Ticonderoga.123


Six miles124 (or fifteen miles)125 above Fort St. Johns Arnold met Allen, with four boats and eighty,126 ninety men,127 (or 150 men).128 Arnold saluted Allen with a discharge of cannon, which was returned by three vollies of small arms. Allen boarded sloop with his party, where they drank several toasts to Congress.129


Allen was determined to proceed and occupy the fort.130 After issuing Allen provisions for his men,131 the two commanders conferred. Allen intended to go forward and hold the ground. Arnold thought it was “wild, impractiable Scheme,”132 “rash,”133 and of no value as long as the Americans controlled the lake.134


Allen arrived at Fort St. Johns in the evening of 18 May,135 where he wrote a rather bombastic letter to several merchants at Montreal requesting them to supply him with provisions, announcing that his force was the advance guard of the American army.136 From the inhabitants Allen learned that a detachment of British were on the road from Montreal. An ambush was laid out. When British were one mile away, the Americans withdrew because of the fatigue of the men, crossed the Richelieu River, and camped for the night,137 across from Fort St. Johns.138


Allen and his men were awakened the next morning to artillery fire and musketry upon their camp.139 Two hundred to two hundred and fifty140 regulars were drawn up across the river,141 with six field pieces.142 Allen hastily retreated with three men missing.143


A few hours after Allen’s hasty departure from Fort St. Johns, at 1000, Arnold, with Liberty and the sloop, now named Enterprise, arrived at Crown Point.144 Here Arnold paused and drew up a long report on the Fort St. Johns raid,145 which he dispatched by Captain Jonathan Brown.146 Arnold intended to arm the two vessels. Arnold again requested relief, then gave praise to Captain Brown. Arnold suggested 1000-1500 men were needed to repair the fort. Arnold passed along the troop level of British troops in Quebec: 717, of whom more than 10 per cent had been captured. As for cannon there was a plentiful supply, eighty-six captured at Fort Ticonderoga and 111 at Crown Point.147


4. Arnold’s Champlain Squadron, 20 May-22 June 1775



 

A contemporary drawing (1776) of the Enterprise, from the Pell print.

 
Liberty and Enterprise sailed down to Fort Ticonderoga on the 20th with Arnold, where Sloan transferred to the sloop.148 Arnold was “determined to arm the Sloop & Schooner immediately.”149 The vessels were at Fort Ticonderoga, with Arnold, on 21 May.150 Arnold had both vessels in “good Order as posable (for the time).”151 Arnold had been fitting out the two vessels. Enterprise had been armed with six cannon and ten swivels, and Liberty with four cannon and six swivels.152 Arnold had “Commissioned” as Captains, John Pout Sloan to the Enterprise and Isaac Mathues to the Liberty.153 He described both men as “judicious, able commanders.”154 Enterprise was established with a crew of thirty-one men, including eighteen marines under First Lieutenant James Watson, and thirteen sailors under Captain John Pout Sloan and First Mate Timothy Almost.155


Allen and his men arrived at Crown Point from Fort St. Johns on 21 May, with no provisions and bone weary.156 Arnold was at Fort Ticonderoga, where he urged Captain John Stephens to send on provisions immediately, allowing Arnold to enlist many of Allen’s men. Arnold now had 120 of his own men at Fort Ticonderoga. Arnold was planning to sail his shipping back to Crown Point, to make a stand there to secure the captured cannon. An urgent request for gunpowder was included.157 Arnold was still at Fort Ticonderoga on 22 May. He was fitting out the Liberty and Enterprise. The sloop had six cannon and ten swivel; the schooner had four cannon and six swivels. Arnold was planning to move up to Crown Point. Arnold was in great need of sailors, gunners, carpenters and other articles for the vessels. “Our safety in great measure depends on them, the vessels, as they will be able to command the lake if properly manned.” Arnold requested the Albany committee to send up “mates, gunners, marines &c.” He enclosed a list of proposed wages. Arnold again repeated the call for gunpowder, having only 150 pounds for 100 men. If the seamen were not available, would the Albany men please to ask for help from the New York authorities.158


Allen’s beaten troops arrived at Fort Ticonderoga on the 22nd. Arnold had no time for them. He sailed up to Crown Point to cover that post against any British counterattack. The Liberty and Enterprise as “well Armed as possable under our Curcumstances.” With Allen’s eighty men, Arnold had about 150 men at Crown Point. He was in expectation of two or three hundred more “hourly.” Arnold said that most of Allen’s men gone home.159


Meanwhile, the Committee of One Hundred at New York heard of the fall of Fort Ticonderoga and on 15 May and referred the matter to the Continental Congress.160 On 17 May Colonel James Easton arrived at the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts with Edward Mott’s and Ethan Allen’s letters reporting the capture of Fort Ticonderoga. He was introduced to the body and questioned. A Committee was set up which reported that letters should be written to Connecticut requesting a portion of the captured cannon and suggesting the fort should be repaired and garrisoned. Massachusetts suggested appointing Arnold to bring the cannon to Cambridge, thus solving the command problem.161 It seemed that, having captured the fort and lake, no colony, least of all New York, wanted to be responsible for the maintenance of the lake posts.


The Continental Congress was finally hearing of the newly opened theater of war. On 17 May John Brown arrived by express in Philadelphia, in the night, with news of the capture of Fort Ticonderoga. He awoke the president of the Continental Congress and informed him of the news.162 The next day Brown presented his report of the capture of Fort Ticonderoga to the Continental Congress. Brown, the former secret agent, was asked about the “disposition of the Canadians.” After debate, Congress ordered the cannon removed to the south end of Lake George and requested the northern colonies to help establish a strong garrison there. This was an indirect order to abandon Fort Ticonderoga. An exact inventory of the captured cannon was to be taken “in order that they may be safely returned when the restoration of the former harmony between Great Britain and these colonies . . . shall render it prudent and consistent . . . .”163


The Massachusetts Provincial Congress was trying to coordinate with Connecticut. On the 19th it received a letter from Connecticut concerning Fort Ticonderoga. An answer was prepared outlining Massachusetts’ involvement.164 Three days later the Massachusetts Committee of Safety forwarded Arnold’s letter of 11 May to the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts. The Congress thanked Arnold for his “exertions,” and informed him that Massachusetts was writing Connecticut, to request the latter colony take over the direction of the affair, since the affair began there, pending, of course, directions from the Continental Congress. A copy of the Connecticut letter was sent to Arnold.165


On 22 May the express arrived in New York with the Congressional resolution of 18 May. The  Committee of New York immediately ordered one hundred barrels of provisions sent up to Albany to support the forces to the north, and began purchasing cordage, oakum, pitch and other articles. Connecticut was informed at once and a copy of the resolution sent forward to that colony.166 On 23 May the Congressional resolution arrived in New York. The New York Provincial Congress resolved at once to comply with the directive.167 Several committees to consider how to implement the Continental Congress’s resolve were appointed. The committees reported on 24 May. It was decided to appoint commissioners to oversee the removal of the cannon to Fort George. A letter was also written to Connecticut inviting that colony to station troops at Fort Ticonderoga and Fort George to maintain the places. New York hoped Connecticut would name “trusty” commanders. New York agreed to furnish provisions for the garrisons however. Connecticut was enjoined to prevent any incursions into Quebec and was informed that New York intended to carry out the resolves of the Continental Congress.168


On 24 May the New York Provincial Congress appointed a committee to consider the execution of the Continental Congress resolve of 18 May. The committee reported on the 25th, and the report was taken up, along with other items relating to Lake Champlain. Isaac Low reported that some of the inhabitants of the northern counties were proposing “incursions into the Province of Quebec.” A letter was ordered written to squelch that idea. A delegation had arrived from Connecticut on the 24th and asked for a conference. Two members were directed to meet with them. They soon returned and reported: the Connecticut delegation had delayed a letter from New York to Connecticut, pending the revelation of more facts. The Connecticut Assembly was now sitting and actions taken in its recess were by the Committee of Safety, which had limited powers which did include ordering soldiers about, but did not include appointing commanders. The Connecticut delegation knew that 300 men were stationed at Salisbury, which might be used on the lakes. The men who had taken the posts were not regular soldiers but “adventurers.” Captain Asa Douglas, who lived on the Connecticut-New York border, and Colonel Benedict Arnold, from Massachusetts, had been involved in the capture. The Connecticut men recommended Douglas as a principal “adventurer,” suggested that most of the men were New Yorkers, and knew that their Committee of Safety would not appoint a commander. Connecticut could only send the 300 men. The Connecticut men recommended New York appoint Douglas, who claimed he could raise 700 men in a few days. New York debated withdraw its letter, but allowed it to go unaltered after debate.169 The Provincial Congress now appointed commissioners to oversee the removal of the cannon to Fort George, who were also to supervise the furnishing of provisions to the men on the lakes. A set of instructions was drawn up for them. Letters were written to Massachusetts and New Hampshire, to point out, again, that New York planned to carry out the Continental resolves.170


Connecticut was thus at the center of the stew created by the fall of the forts. On 21 May some sixty prisoners from the lake posts arrived in Hartford.171 The next day Hartford learned of Arnold’s raid on Fort St. Johns and Allen’s repulse.172 On 23 May Connecticut received the text of the Congressional resolution of 18 May. Stunned, the Connecticut men immediately urged the retention of the post of Fort Ticonderoga on the Continental Congress.173


On 25 May Governor Trumbull of Connecticut notified Massachusetts that he had received their letter of 17 May, delivered by Colonel James Easton. Trumbull congratulated Massachusetts on the capture and noted that the matter had been referred to the Continental Congress, since men from three colonies were involved, and none without public authority as far as he knew. The express had just come in with the resolution of 18 May. Trumbull pointed out that, as far as Connecticut was concerned, Massachusetts could have any guns it wanted, but Congress had assigned the care of the fort to New York, and Connecticut felt itself not entitled to give commands there. He acknowledged the necessity of maintaining and securing the frontier forts, and enclosed a copy of a letter from the Connecticut delegates to New York.174


Back on the lakes, Arnold was still calling for help. On the 23rd he dispatched a report to Massachusetts by Captain Elisha Phelps.175 He expected a British visit if they could get bateaux from Montreal to Fort St. Johns. Arnold thought the “Regulars have good information on our strengths and movements.”176 He had “Commissioned” John Prout Sloan to the Enterprise and Isaac Mathues to the Liberty as Captains. He had asked New York to furnish gunners and seamen to man the vessels; “at present obliged to Stay on board one of them my self-.”177 Arnold’s present plan was that the vessels will cruise on the lake, to “defend our frontiers, ‘till men, provision and ammunition are furnished to carry on the war.”178 One bright spot was reported: Arnold had received the first provisions from Albany. He requested that powder be sent and a sum of money to pay enlistment bounties. Money had been captured in the Betsey but he chose not to use it. Arnold also requested that a commander be sent up to relieve him.179


One of Allen’s missing showed up at Crown Point on the 23rd, reporting that 400 regulars were at Fort St. Johns on 19 May, with more coming, and were making preparations to cross the lake and attack the posts. Arnold notified Fort George and Skenesborough “to rally the Country.”180


Arnold, still at Crown Point, reported again on 26 May. He had the sloop and schooner “in good Order & Tolerably well manned.” Enterprise had six cannon and twelve swivel guns, Liberty four cannon and eight swivels. The “Eight Gentlemen... from Hartford, who are Seamen,” had arrived and been put to work; more mortars were being shipped to Fort George. A few more soldiers had arrived but there was very little other change. Provisions were now coming in from Albany. Perhaps even more welcome was the £500 brought by the Colonels Webb and Porter and Barnabas Deane from Hartford.181 As for the British, Arnold had late word from Fort St. Johns that they had retired to Chambly.182


The Albany Committee was getting down to the serious work of supplying the lake. On 26 May the Albany Committee notified the Provincial Congress of New York of its receipt if the latter body’s letter of 20 May, enclosing the resolution of the Continental Congress requiring abandonment of the lake posts. Albany was raising two companies of fifty men each to help remove the cannon to Fort George. They would be ready in two or three days. However, there was a severe shortage of gunpowder. Further the Albany Committee could not see how the provincial forces could withstand the British attack being hastily prepared at Fort St. Johns. Albany requested assistance from the New York Provincial Congress. Particularly needed was powder, blankets, pitch, tar, oakum, nails, spikes, gin, ropes, camp equipment and provisions. As per Arnold’s request, Albany asked for two mates, two gunners, two gunner’s mates, two boatswains, and eighteen sailors, for Liberty and Enterprise. Finally the Albany Committee pointed out that the Continental Congress had no knowledge that the Americans had control of the lake on 18 May, when the resolution of withdrawal was passed. Albany suggested fortifying and holding Fort Ticonderoga, “by far the strongest and most important” of the forts.183


Captain Asa Douglas, bearing a letter from Allen to the Continental Congress, arrived at New York. On 26 May he solicited an appointment with the Provincial Congress of New York, and was admitted to the body. After an interview a committee was set up to examine Douglas and determine what he wanted. The Committee found Douglas wanted to deliver Allen’s letter to them instead of the Continental Congress, requested that the Congress reward the troops who had taken Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point with provisions and money, solicited an appointment as commander of troops from the King’s District, and wanted a reimbursement of £18 he had spent on the expedition. The Congress took no action on the committee report.184 New York would like to avoid, it seemed, any action concerning the lake posts.


The Provincial Congress of Massachusetts realized that there might be some tender feelings in New York. Fort Ticonderoga was, after all, in the latter colony. On the 26th a letter of apology was sent to New York, pleading the necessity of seizing the cannon as an excuse for colonial territorial infringement. Massachusetts promised to return any cannon it received, if requested and directed by the Continental Congress.185 The next day Captain Jonathan Brown arrived at Watertown with Arnold’s dispatches. The Provincial Congress of Massachusetts took up the question of the lake posts. One Colonel Joseph Henshaw was ordered to Hartford to confer with Connecticut officials. If Connecticut had taken steps to secure and maintain the posts, then Henshaw was to proceed to Fort Ticonderoga, and send Arnold to Watertown to render his accounts and be honorably discharged.  If Connecticut had taken no action, and the General Assembly was not in session, Henshaw was to go to Fort Ticonderoga, order Arnold to remain there and Henshaw was to increase his force as Henshaw thought necessary. If the Connecticut General Assembly were in session but had taken no steps in regard to Fort Ticonderoga, Henshaw was to confer with the Connecticut men and report back to Watertown.186 In a letter to Arnold, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress extended its congratulations on the capture of the lake. Then the Congress informed Arnold that Colonel Joseph Henshaw had been sent to Hartford to confer with Connecticut and enclosed a copy of its resolution. The Congress agreed that the posts should be held and noted that it fully expected the Continental Congress to so order, the Massachusetts congress having addressed them upon that subject.187 Massachusetts had now received Connecticut’s letter, the essence of which is that the post should be held.188 On 28 May the Massachusetts Committee of Safety notified Arnold that the Massachusetts Provincial Congress had now taken up the matter of the forces on Lake Champlain, and that Arnold should conform to orders from that body.189


Captain Joseph Trumbull (in Massachusetts) received “private” intelligence from New York on 28 May, to the effect that New York considered the Congressional resolution of 18 May to not call for the complete dismantling of Fort Ticonderoga, but only to supply any post built at the south end of Fort George. In this sense, New York was executing the resolve.190


Arnold, at Crown Point, was hosting a conference of the commanders on 27 May, aboard the Enterprise.191 Allen was present, but his pretensions to command had evaporated along with his soldiers.192 It was decided to advance to Pointe au Fer with the Liberty, Enterprise and a “number of Armed Boats, well mann’d.” There the Americans would act on the defensive, command the lake, and bottle up any British counterattack.193 Enterprise had been armed with six cannon and two swivel guns; Liberty with four cannon and eight swivels.194 Arnold had collected about 150 men, and expected 1000 more from Connecticut and New York in a short time.195 Before they could sail the resolution of the Continental Congress, requiring the abandonment of Fort Ticonderoga, arrived,196 express from Albany on 29 May.197


Both Allen and Arnold were stunned by this true child of folly. Allen scribbled out a long letter to the Congress. He was “much surprised.” The abandonment of Fort Ticonderoga for Fort George would “ruin the Frontier settlements, which extended a hundred miles north of Fort George into the New Hampshire Grants. This was a very bad way to treat these people after both Connecticut and Massachusetts had asked them to assist in the capture of Fort Ticonderoga. Further, such action would give command of the lake to the British, allowing raiders into the western settlements. At this moment the colonies held “Actual Command of the Lake” by virtue of the captured Liberty and Enterprise. The commanders on the lake had, in Council of War on 27 May, decided to advance to Pointe aur Fer and make a stand there to defend the lake. Just as they were ready to sail, the resolution came to hand. This was not the time to hold back: “the more vigorous the Colonies push the war against the Kings Troops in Canada, the more friends we will find in that Country.” Allen then explored the benefits to be gained from an invasion of Canada, and at the very least, the maintenance of the most advanced frontier post possible.198


Arnold took pen in hand and recapped the late events on the lake, and noted the same risk of exposing the frontiers as had Allen. Fort Ticonderoga was the “Key of this extensive Country,” and should be held.199 In a letter to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety he confessed he was “surprised and alarmed” at this resolution.200


Barnabas Deane and his party were still at Crown Point on 29 May. Perhaps the appearance of this resolution sent them south to lobby the Albany Committee. He arrived there on 31 May. Deane reported on the little squadron. Enterprise was armed with six 6-pounders and fourteen swivels. Liberty had four 4-pounders and eight swivels. Two boats were also being fitted with swivels, reported Deane.201


Connecticut was prepared to ignore Congress in this matter. John Brown was in Hartford on 29 May, returning from his dispatch mission to Congress. Governor Trumbull took advantage of his presence (Brown was headed for Massachusetts) to advise that colony on the latest moves. Connecticut had received a letter from the Provincial Congress of New York dated 25 May. On considering the letter Connecticut resolved to increase the forces authorized for Fort Ticonderoga to 1000 men (from 400), under command of Colonel Benjamin Hinman. The Connecticut men were to stay until relieved by New York, with Hinman to take command of all Connecticut forces. Hinman was ordered to strictly prevent any hostile incursions into Quebec. New York was requested to forward supplies, but was short of powder. Trumbull requested Massachusetts to assist in furnishing that article. Trumbull fondly hoped that Hinman’s command, coupled with Arnold’s would be enough to hold the fort.202


Governor Trumbull’s express letter of 27 May reached the Provincial Congress of New York on the 29th. Arnold’s report of 23 May was enclosed and both were read to the New Yorkers. An answering letter was approved and the Committee charged with finding ways and means to remove the Fort Ticonderoga cannon was ordered to furnish three hundred and twenty barrels of provisions to the lake posts, as quietly as possible.203


The Massachusetts Provincial Congress considered a number of papers and reports brought from Fort Ticonderoga, some by Elisha Phelps, on the 31st. He was introduced to the Congress and questioned. A large committee was set up to report on the papers after due consideration.204 The same day Colonel Joseph Henshaw, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress’ delegate to Connecticut, had conferred with Governor Trumbull he learned that Connecticut had appointed Colonel Benjamin Hinman as commander at Fort Ticonderoga, and that he was raising 1000 men for the garrison. Further, four companies of “artificers, &c.,” were raising at Albany to repair and defend the place. Henshaw’s instructions were to recall Arnold to render his accounts, if Connecticut had ordered a garrison to Fort Ticonderoga. Instead, Henshaw, at Hartford, ordered Arnold and Allen to “guard against any surprise” until the reinforcements arrived. These orders were sent from Hartford on 31 May, entrusted to Arnold’s subordinate, Captain Jonathan Brown.205


The Continental Congress was feeling the displeasure of the northern colonies. On 29 May a second resolution to the Canadians, urging them to join the revolt, was adopted.206 On 31 May, Arnold’s report of 23 May arrived, with its report on British preparations at Fort St. Johns. Governor Trumbull was requested by the Congress to send a strong reinforcement to Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and to appoint a person, “in whom he can confide,” to command there. As many cannon as necessary to defend these posts were to be retained. The New York Provincial Congress was to be informed of this resolution.207 On 1 June the Continental Congress resolved that Connecticut appoint Commissaries to receive at Albany the provisions furnished by New York, and disperse them to the forces on the Lake.208 Finally, the Congress resolved “that no expedition or incursion ought to be made, by any colony, or body of colonists, against or into Canada.” The commander at Fort Ticonderoga was to be so informed and the resolution translated into French, and spread into French Quebec. The resolution was to be transmitted to New York and the other bordering colonies.209


The Provincial Congress of Massachusetts approved a letter to Arnold on 1 June, reporting it had received his letters of 19 May and 23 May by way of Captain Jonathan Brown and Captain Elisha Phelps. Copies of these had been forwarded to New Hampshire. The Congress “Highly” approved of Arnold’s acquisitions. Arnold was informed that reinforcements and provisions were on the move from New York and Connecticut. The Congress regretted Arnold’s repeated requests for replacement and noted they had the “greatest confidence” in him. He was desired to maintain his command over the Massachusetts forces, at least until New York or Connecticut took on the responsibility. The Congress then informed Arnold that news had just arrived that Connecticut had ordered 1000 men and 500 pounds of powder up to the lakes. Arnold was advised to use the £160 captured in the sloop, if necessary, accounting for it, and Massachusetts would repay it when directed by the Continental Congress. Arnold was instructed to raise his regiment to 400 men if necessary.210


The Massachusetts Provincial Congress then turned to Connecticut, answering the letter dated 27 May. Massachusetts concurs that holding the lake post is of the “utmost importance,” and is happy that Connecticut has repeatedly and early expressed that opinion to the Continental Congress. Informs Connecticut of the “private” intelligence of 28 May from New York. Accordingly, Massachusetts was not sending any reinforcement to Fort Ticonderoga.211 The Massachusetts Provincial Congress sent copies of Arnold’s letters and correspondence with Connecticut to New Hampshire, to inform them of the situation of Fort Ticonderoga. Massachusetts expressed the need to hold the lake posts. Massachusetts had agreed to furnish 400 men and £100 to seize the places. Connecticut was sending four companies and 500 pounds of powder. Massachusetts solicited New Hampshire to make a contribution to the “common cause.”212

  

New York was still unhappy over the whole thing. On 1 June the New York Provincial Congress received Connecticut’s answer to its request for assistance at Fort Ticonderoga.213 It then informed the Albany Committee that, being unable to garrison the posts on the lakes, it has applied to the eastern colonies for assistance. Connecticut was to send troops, the commander of whom was to also be commander of the posts by them garrisoned. New York requested this commander use “diligence” to prevent incursions into Canada. Connecticut was sending 1000 men under Colonel Benjamin Hinman. Albany was requested to inform the countryside of his appointment. There was, at this time, no powder to forward from New York. Albany’s letter of 26 May had been received and forwarded to the Continental Congress.214 On 2 June Peter T. Curtenius was appointed by the New York Provincial Congress as a Commissary to furnish stores and provisions to the lake garrisons.215 The next day Curtenius was ordered to furnish to the Commissioners at Albany, for use on the lakes, two mates, two gunners, two carpenters, two gunner’s mates, two boatswains, twenty seamen, pork, pitch, rice, tar, 500 pounds of powder, oakum, shovels, spades, crowbars, pickaxes, nails, camp kettles. Other items were to be procured at Albany: spikes, a gin, axes, rope, grindstones, and cart boxes.216 On 7 June the New York Provincial Congress ordered additional men and supplies sent up to the lakes: “10 men of the train of artillery, 12 ship carpenters, 2 gunsmiths, 2 blacksmiths, 2 masons, hatchets, broadaxes, spades, hoes, ironwork, sailcoth, etc.”217


An indication of the mixed New York emotions was the publication, on 2 June, by the New York Provincial Congress of a broadside, aimed at French Quebec, disavowing any New York participation in the attack on Fort St. Johns.218


On 2 June the Massachusetts Provincial Congress appointed a committee to examine Captain Elisha Phelps expenses in supplying the men at Fort Ticonderoga. Upon examination the account was unsupported by vouchers. The committee reported and consideration was delayed.219 On 8 June another committee was appointed to examine Phelps’ expenses, for transporting provisions to, and cannon from, Fort Ticonderoga.220 Meanwhile, on the 4th, Colonel Henshaw reported to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress on his trip to Connecticut. His papers were turned over to the Committee of Safety and a subcommittee of the Congress. The committee on Colonel James Easton’s letter suggested these first two confer on it too.221 The Massachusetts Provincial Congress soon noticed that Trumbull’s orders to Colonel Hinman are to command his regiment and reinforce the posts there, but contained no positive language on commanding the forts.222


Meanwhile Arnold was beginning more active operations. On 1 June the crew of the Enterprise consisted of thirty-one men, eighteen marines and thirteen sailors, including officers.223 About 6 June the Liberty and Enterprise sailed up the lake with Arnold, going as far as Isle aux Noix.224 On 9 June Governor Sir Guy Carleton proclaims martial law throughout Quebec province.225


Colonel Ethan Allen, at Crown Point, wrote to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress on 9 June, after Easton returned. He pointed out the relative weakness of the British forces in Canada and urged an American invasion. Allen thought 2000-3000 men could conquer all Quebec (Canada). He noted that provisions and powder were still scarce on the lake and suggested Massachusetts use their influence in getting them forwarded them.226


Enterprise and Liberty returned to Crown Point from a patrol down the lake, at 1700 on 10 June. The captains reported that 300 regulars were at Fort St. Johns, fortifying.227


On 10 June the Allen-Easton clique held a meeting, nominating Allen, Captain Seth Warner, and Captain Remember Baker, to go to the Continental Congress. Allen offered to raise a regiment of 500 men in the “emergency,” if they were paid. Among others listed as signers were “Captain James Noble, commandant at this place,”228 Noble was part of Arnold’s command. His payroll was submitted to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress on 6 July.229


On 12 June the Massachusetts Provincial Congress appointed a Committee of Three (Walter Sooner, Colonel Jeremiah Foster, James Sullivan) to go to Fort Ticonderoga and examine into the state of affairs there.230 This is due, in part, to the anticipation of trouble about divided command due to Trumbull’s vaguely worded orders to Colonel Hinman. The Committee was to make it clear to Arnold that he was to be commanded by Hinman.231 The next day the Massachusetts Provincial Congress received a letter from Governor Trumbull of Connecticut, enclosing a letter from Colonel Benedict Arnold, and three resolves of the Continental Congress.232


The Committee for Ticonderoga received its instructions from the Massachusetts Provincial Congress on the 13th. It was to go to the forts at Ticonderoga and Crown Point by way of the road through the New Hampshire Grants, to examine the quality of the road and its suitability for transporting provisions, to take a copy of Arnold’s commission and instructions and examine how he had executed these instructions, to give such orders to Arnold or his men as the committee deemed suitable, provided that the number of men did not exceed 400, and that the commanding officer from Connecticut was to have the chief command, if the men were retained a Committee of two was to be appointed to furnish provisions and supplies, and a Commissary to dispense such supplies, for the Massachusetts forces. Arnold’s “spirit, capacity, and conduct” were to be examined, and he was to be continued if the committee thought it best, if discharged he was to be ordered to Watertown to render his accounts. The men were to be mustered and paid advance pay, and if Arnold were discharged, the Committee could appoint officers and enlist men up to 400, appointing a muster-master and paymaster for them. They were to survey the ordnance and other stores at the forts, purchase powder, and do anything necessary to maintain and strengthen these posts. After this thorough survey, the Committee was to inform Massachusetts, New York and Connecticut, and, particularly, the Continental Congress, of the “necessity and importance of maintaining the said posts for the general defense of these Colonies.”233 On the 14th the Committee for Ticonderoga drew £400 for pay for Arnold’s men, and £20 for expenses, from the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts.234


Arnold reported to the Continental Congress, from Crown Point on 13 June. He had recently sent a man to Montreal, to visit some merchants with whom Arnold was acquainted with there. By his delegate’s return and various other visits and communications, Arnold reported that many Canadians favored the colonies and awaited an expedition into their colony to join the Americans. Arnold reported that a number offered to join him during his patrol to Isle aux Noix. Carleton was now at Montreal, trying to raise the militia. Carleton had only 550 effectives in Canada (7th, 26th Regt), of whom 300 were at Fort St. Johns and Chambly, 40 at Montreal, 12 at Lachine, 40 at Trois Rivieres, and 120 at Quebec. Arnold thought 2000 men could invade Quebec and carry the country. Arnold offered general reasons for the invasion, himself as commander, and dispatched Oswald with the letter.235


 
 

Philip Schuyler, Major General in command of the Northern Department.

On 15 June the Continental Congress appointed a commander to command “all the continental forces raised, or to be raised, for the Defence of American liberty.” General George Washington was appointed. Congress thus “adopted” the various forces throughout the colonies.236 Among the forces thus adopted was the quarrelsome miniature army on Lake Champlain. A set of Major Generals was also appointed on 15 June, including Philip John Schuyler, assigned to the Northern Department.237


5. Arnold’s Mutiny, 23-25 June 1775


About 18 June Colonel Benjamin Hinman arrived at Fort Ticonderoga with the Connecticut reinforcements for the lake posts. Trumbull has worded Hinman’s instructions to give him authority to command his regiment and reinforce the forts. Hinman and Arnold met and each read the other’s instructions, upon which Arnold refused to resign the command.238 Three days later this disquieting information was reported to the Continental Congress by the Albany Committee. The argument over command must be solved, for Carleton was moving. Late intelligence had it that the Canadian Indians were growing restive, and may begin raiding at Carleton’s behest, that 600 troops are at Fort St. Johns, trying to stop all persons from passing that post, and that the British were building “Floating Batteries and Boats.” The forces on the lakes were very short of powder.239


About 22 June the Massachusetts Committee arrived at Fort Ticonderoga. The situation was found to be as was feared, but not totally unexpected. Arnold claimed command of the lake squadron, Fort Ticonderoga, Crown Point, the landing place, Fort George, and Skenesborough, although Hinman had arrived with 1000 men from Connecticut.240 The committee found that Arnold had appointed Captain Rufus Herrick as commander at Fort Ticonderoga. Hinman’s men were obliged to take orders from him.241


On 23 June the Massachusetts Committee went up to Crown Point and had a meeting with Arnold. They intended to let him know forthwith that he would be under Hinman’s command, and to surrender the forts to the Connecticut colonel.242 Arnold asked for a copy of the Committee’s instructions and was given one. After reading the instructions he was “disconcerted,” and declared he would be second to none, and after some contemplation, and presumably heated discussion, verbally resigned.243 In a fit of spite and wounded pride he then ordered his regiment disbanded.244 The Massachusetts Committee, not to be outdone, accepted Arnold’s resignation and ordered him to turn over the squadron, posts, and his regiment, to the direction of Hinman. Arnold was ordered to Watertown to present his accounts.245


As soon as Arnold disbanded his men, word circulated that they were not to be paid for past services. They became dissatisfied and “mutinous.” The Committee promised to pay all back wages as soon as the pay rolls were made up.246 The Massachusetts Committee immediately appointed James Easton as a Colonel, to enlist Arnold’s men and assist Connecticut on the lakes, under Hinman’s superior command. The majority of Arnold’s men reenlisted with Easton,247 including several officers. The regiment was to constitute 400 men.248 Captain James Noble, Arnold’s commander at Crown Point, enlisted with his company. The Massachusetts Committee appointed William Satterlee249 as muster-master, and advanced Noble £100 advance pay.250


Arnold was doubly wounded: he was turned out of his regiment, and now could see that many of his men had thrown in with the Allen-Easton-Brown clique. On 24 June Arnold, at Crown Point, returned a prideful, hurt, letter of resignation to the Massachusetts Committee. He pointed out, quite rightly, that the time to examine an officer’s “spirit, capacity, and conduct” was before he received a commission, not after. He did not choose to serve under a “younger” officer of the same rank (Hinman) and surrender to him the posts and fleet that he, Arnold, had conquered. Further, Massachusetts had not forwarded money to pay his necessary bills (he had advanced £100 of his own money). All in all, Arnold felt his honor, honesty, conduct, were being questioned, for which reasons he offered his resignation.251


The Committee then desired to speak to Arnold’s troops, but were refused an audience. Arnold and some of his men retired to the vessels of the lake squadron. Some loose threats were made about sailing down to Fort St. Johns and delivering the vessels to the British. Enterprise and Liberty were drawn off into the lake and anchored. The committeemen rowed out in a bateau, but they were “treated very ill and threatened.” As they rowed back they were fired on with small arms and swivels by Arnold’s people.252


The committeemen, safely ashore, reported that “a dangerous mutiny, set on Foot by some persons Employed by Col Arnold an officer of our colony who appeard to have their own Interest more at heart than the publick good” was underway.253 Walter Spooner, one of the committee, reported that a “mutiny arose amongst some of Arnolds men...which seemed to be attended with dangerous Symptoms.”254 Arnold was not directly accused of participating.


When the committee returned to Ticonderoga, Colonel Edward Mott, who had just arrived,255 persuaded Hinman to let him, Judge William Duer of Charlotte County (New York),256 and Lieutenant Jeremiah Halsey, row up to the warships in a bateau. Colonel Sullivan also went. These men got on board about 1100 in the morning. They were (“he” says Mott, referring to Arnold) confined three aboard each vessel, and guarded by men with fixed bayonets. The negotiators were kept until evening, when they were dismissed. Sullivan was “much insulted” by Captain John Brown (Jonathan Brown?). But the prisoners reasoned with the mutineers, and convinced many of their error. Many of the mutineers declared they had been deceived by Arnold. Upon the party’s return to Fort Ticonderoga, Hinman ordered Halsey, with twenty-five men and a boat, to return to the vessels, get what people he could on board to join him, and bring one or both vessels to the fort.257


Meanwhile, the Massachusetts Committee had found Easton, and paid him £280 in advance pay, and appointed Jonas Fay as muster-master. They also paid £20 to Captain Remember Baker, to enlist men under Colonel Easton. The committee promised to pay Easton the remainder of the advance pay later. John Brown was appointed as Major, with Fay as surgeon.258 The Massachusetts Committee appointed Timothy Edwards and Samuel Brown as a Committee to supply Easton’s men, with such supplies as New York did not furnish, and Captain Elisha Phelps to act as Commissary under the Committee.259


Mutiny must have looked a good bit less exciting in the warm dawn light. Halsey found no opposition and, on the morning of 25 June, he brought the Enterprise and Liberty down to Fort Ticonderoga.260 The mutiny, “which . . . might have been attended with fatal Consequences,”261 was squelched due to the efforts of Judge Duer and the Connecticut officers, reported the committee.262


6. Changing Policies, May-June 1775


Meanwhile, Ethan Allen had arrived in Philadelphia to importune Congress. On 23 June Colonel Allen and Captain Seth Warner present their letter of 10 June to the Continental Congress. They were called in and interviewed by the members. Congress then directed the commander of the New York department to obtain a list of the men involved in the capture of Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and their garrisoning, so that they might be paid, to commence from 3 May until discharge, the pay to be the same as that of other American forces, except no officer’s pay to be higher than that of captain. The Continental Congress then suggested that the Provincial Congress of New York raise a regiment from the Green Mountain Boys, to be used in Schuyler’s forces.263


Three days later the Albany Committee’s letter was received, by express, at Philadelphia.264 After some consideration and debate, the Continental Congress issued the following orders to Major General Philip Schuyler: he was to proceed to Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point as soon as “conveniently” possible, examine the state of the garrisons, troops, supplies, posts, the lake squadron, and seek the best intelligence from Canada of the disposition of the Indians and Canadians. He was to confer with Hinman and Arnold on the subject of Arnold’s letter to Congress. He was to report all he found to Congress. He was to order the preparation of “boats and stores for securing to the United Colonies the command of those waters adjacent to Crown Point and Ticonderoga.” Since Congress, by resolution, found Carleton to be stirring up the Indians, Schuyler was to “exert his utmost power to destroy or take all vessels, boats or floating batteries . . . on or near the waters of the lakes.” Further, if Schuyler found it “practicable, and that it will not be disagreeable to the Canadians, he do immediately take possession of St. Johns, Montreal, and any other parts of the country. . . . “ Schuyler was directed to apply to Governor Trumbull of Connecticut for additional funds and ammunition, if needed.265 The next day John Hancock transmitted Schuyler’s new orders of 27 June to him. Schuyler was informed that Governor Trumbull of Connecticut was also being notified in regard to money and ammunition. Schuyler was enjoined to secrecy concerning these orders.266


7. The Lake Squadron Under Halsey, 26 June-18 July 1775


Jeremiah Halsey’s reward for his part in subduing the mutiny was to be appointed commander of the Enterprise and “Commodore” of the Lake Champlain Squadron by Colonel Hinman.267 Captain James Stewart went to the Liberty to take command of her. These appointments may be approximately dated to 25 June.


The Massachusetts Committee was still at Fort Ticonderoga and now saw fit to inform New York of what had transpired. The committee explained its mission to Fort Ticonderoga, announced that Massachusetts had a regiment of 400 men on the lakes, which had to draw supplies from New York, and announced that the post must be held. If it were not, raiders could land at the site of Fort Edward (now razed) on the South Bay of Lake Champlain, and raid the whole upper New York country, as well as the back country of the northern colonies. The Committee thought “all possible care ought to be take to keep the Command of Lake Champlain, which perhaps, may be more Easly Effected by armed Vessels of Various Constructions.” The Committee specifically praised Judge Duer to the New York authorities.268 The Massachusetts Committee, at Springfield on 3 July, informed Connecticut of its thoughts on the lake posts, and praises the Connecticut officers help in the late mutiny. Hinman had impressed the Committee as “polite, generous, and manly.”269


Meanwhile, Schuyler, in New York, had learned of his appointment. On 28 June he announced his appointment to Hinman. Schuyler outlined general directions for Hinman, requested a return of his troops and the places they were stationed, “also of the Number of Vessels on Lake George, and what Kind they are, and their Burden, the same of those on Lake Champlain.” Hinman was urged to keep the best intelligence possible in view, spread the view among the Canadians that the Americans had no animosity to them (particularly disavowing Allen’s late incursion) and prepare a retreat to Fort George or South Bay, in case of “possible Accidents.”270 Schuyler had questions for Congress too. On 29 June he asked for an arrangement of general and staff officers, rations, and pay for the troops, and enclosed a copy of his letter to Hinman.271


Just now, on 30 June, came the new orders from Congress. Schuyler, acknowledging receipt of the orders, said that he would proceed to Ticonderoga at once, first taking steps to have all necessary supplies forwarded after him with due speed. Speed was so essential that Schuyler suggested moving the Connecticut troops in New York City to Albany. At Albany they could help in moving supplies, building boats, and in the invasion, the forces at Ticonderoga being “vastly inadequate.” So essential was this request that Schuyler sent it express, to get the “sense of the Congress.” Schuyler requested a part of the riflemen raising in Pennsylvania for this frontier service. Schuyler was dispatching Walter Livingston to Connecticut to receive money and ammunition. Schuyler suggested that it was now “pressingly important” to appoint the staff officers he had previously recommended.272


Lieutenant Jeremiah Halsey273 stayed in command of the fleet. He was listed by Schuyler as captain of the Enterprise on 1 July.274 “He was bewildered” between Arnold’s and Allen’s friends. The sloop and schooner mostly rode at anchor off Fort Ticonderoga.275 Halsey gave himself the title “Commodore of all Armed Vessels on Lake Champlain and Lake George.”276 On 1 July 1775 the officers and crew of the Enterprise left pay, although this may have occurred a few days before. The total payroll, from 3 May to 1 July 1775, was £135.6.2 1/2, which included £55.3.5 1/4 which Arnold had advanced and £16.4.0 for 27 blankets issued to the crew. The number discharged was thirty-one, the entire crew.277 However, it appears that James Watson stayed as Marine Lieutenant. [Bird/Belloni] James Stewart was in command of the Liberty by 1 July.278


On 2 July Congress received Schuyler’s express letter of 30 June. He was ordered not to remove any troops from New York City, but to raise the regiment of Green Mountain Boys under their own officers, and such other men as needed from the vicinity of Fort Ticonderoga.279 The next day John Hancock informed Schuyler of Congress’ resolves of 1 July. Hancock pointed out that seizing the British vessels on the lakes was a “premptory” order, but the invasion was to take place only when the preconditions had been met. Hancock sent forward information on pay and officers, delegated the setting of rations to Schuyler, and informed him that fifty quarter casks of powder were coming from Philadelphia.280


Schuyler, at New York, replied to the Continental Congress on the 3rd. Schuyler pointed out that the Green Mountain Boys and the men in the vicinity of Ticonderoga were the same people, and that it would be difficult to raise more than 500 men from them. There were only some 1300 men on the lakes. After guarding the lines of communication and the forts, there would only be 900 to attack Fort St. Johns, barely enough to destroy the British shipping. Schuyler felt he was under orders to invade, but did not want to with such a small force: a setback would hazard command of the lakes. Schuyler was leaving New York today, and his second in command, Brigadier General Richard Montgomery would follow him.281


On 5 July Arnold, who had been at Crown Point, finally departed from the lakes.282 The Massachusetts Committee was reporting to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress that same day. They noted the essential nature of the posts and suggested keeping the lake with “armed vessels of various constructions to be kept constantly cruising on the lake, and small boats with swivel guns to act as scouts...”283 On 7 July the Massachusetts Provincial Congress discovered it had no money to pay the remaining advance to Easton and let him know this unpalatable news.284 They then ordered £252.22.01 1/2 paid to Captain Samuel Herrick’s company, from 3 May to 25 June 1775, being the balance of the payroll due. £23.12.0 of this sum had been advanced by Arnold.285


A replacement for Halsey was considered necessary by some on the lake. Colonel Edward Mott had anticipated this problem and had written to Connecticut to find one. On 5 July Governor Trumbull informed Schuyler of Mott’s request. Mott had suggested an acquaintance of his, Captain Robert Niles. Governor Trumbull asked for instructions from Schuyler before performing this chore. Trumbull also reported that Captain Asa Douglass had arrived in Hartford from Schuyler, seeking powder. Trumbull would issue forty half barrels of that valuable substance to him.286


Mott wrote again to Trumbull on 6 July, from Albany, sending the letter by Captain Aaron Stevens. Mott’s mission was to call on the Albany Committee with information about the lake posts, and then proceed to the Provincial Congress of New York. He had arrived express about 2200 on 5 July.287


On 7 July Colonel Hinman made an overdue report answering Schuyler’s letter of 29 June. He reported that Carleton has 350 men, some Canadians and a few Indians at Fort St. Johns, and about 250 men at other posts. They were fortifying Fort St. Johns and “building some water craft.”  The passes into Canada were heavily guarded, the British being very cautious. Hinman had sent to Skenesborough and found the place held by some of Arnold’s men. Hinman, expecting Schuyler soon, had not given any further directions for that place. Hinman “find myself unable to stere in this Stormy Cituation,” provisions and rum were short, causing “grate Uneaseyness to the Men.”288


On 9 July Schuyler arrived at Albany, where he found a number of people waiting to present their views on the situation on the lake.289 Captain Sloan was there, and no doubt filled in Schuyler on Halsey’s shortcomings. Sloan left on the 11th and Schuyler promptly wrote to the New York Provincial Congress to find a commander for the lake. Schuyler thought he could not procure such a man on the lake.290 Schuyler then reported to Hancock. The Indians were fence-sitting for the moment. The controversy at Ticonderoga had thrown everything into vast confusion there. Enterprise was without captain or pilot, they having been dismissed or left. Schuyler now planned to go up much sooner to restore order there. There had been much provision sent up, but there was still a shortage. Schuyler needed the staff officers quickly appointed to prevent more wastage or embezzlement. He also requested copies of the articles of war, to restore discipline. Money, £15,000 had come from Connecticut, but powder was short. Schuyler pointed out he was very weak in vessels to transport troops across the lake, and even with those vessels required to keep the command of the water, if Carleton should “provide himself with a Naval Force.” Schuyler expected to provide more vessels when he arrived at Ticonderoga. Schuyler expected to arrive there on 14 or 15 July.291


Arnold was also at Albany and had a long meeting with Schuyler. At Schuyler’s request Arnold wrote to Congress to inform them of the lake situation. There were 300 men at Crown Point, awaiting orders, 600 at Ticonderoga awaiting orders, and 300 at Fort George, a few building boats and scouting. There was no engineer, gunner, and little provision or powder. The British were fortifying at Fort St. Johns and collecting timber for a vessel.292


On 15 July the New York Committee of Safety received Schuyler’s letter of 11 July. They consulted with Captain Patrick Dennis on a commander for the lake vessel, who recommended Captain James Smith. Smith was called in and expressed his “great willingness and cheerfulness” to serve. The Committee appointed him as a captain of an “armed vessel in the Continental service,” to receive a major’s pay. Smith was to be under Schuyler’s or an appropriate commander’s command and be commissioned by the Continental Congress. Schuyler would designate the vessel Smith would command. Smith was recommended to Schuyler as of “excellent character as a sea officer,” who had turned down a merchant command to serve. Schuyler was informed of the conditions of appointment in a letter from the Committee, which suggested that Smith receive the rank of Major, as well as the pay.293


More intelligence was arriving from Canada. On 17 July Trumbull informed Schuyler of the latest. There were 350 soldiers at Fort St. Johns, 100 at Montreal, and 40 at Chambly. Those at Fort St. Johns had picketed an acre of ground, with some field pieces not yet mounted. A good lookout was being kept on the passes. A number of bateaux and two “floating Batteries” were being built below the fort.294


That same day reinforcements were ordered up for Schuyler by the Continental Congress. General Wooster was ordered to send 1000 of his Connecticut men from New York up to Albany, to be commanded by Schuyler. Schuyler’s requested staff appointments were also made: Walter Livingston, commissary of stores and provisions, deputy quartermaster general Donald Campbell, with the rank of colonel, and deputy muster master Gunning Bedford. The New York Provincial Congress was asked to recommend a deputy adjutant general or brigade major.295 Two days later, after receiving an express from Schuyler, Congress gave him authority to dispose and order any troops in New York as he might think best, subject to Washington’s future orders.296


On 18 July Schuyler finally arrived at Fort Ticonderoga. He found the place in disarray: the sawmills out of repair, a shortage of carpenters, and only enough boat lift for 200 soldiers.297


8. Lake Patrols, July-August 1775


The Americans had now begun more active scouting in preparation for the coming advance. Liberty returned to Crown Point from such a patrol to the north end of the lake on 26 July. Off Isle la Motte she met two canoes with French and Indians, who informed the Americans that Carleton was trying to raise the tribes, that the Canadians were indifferent, that a picketed fort with a ditch was erecting at Fort St. Johns, and there were 450 men there. British scouts had been as far south as Gilliland’s, thirty-five miles north of Ticonderoga. Halsey, at Crown Point in the Enterprise, sailed down to Fort Ticonderoga with this news. Captain Remember Baker returned from a scout into Missiquoi Bay, with similar information, the same day.298


A few men were entering the lake service. Sailor Oliver Hatch enlisted on 28 July.299


On 30 July schooner Liberty sailed from Crown Point up the lake on another patrol. At 1600 her lookouts saw a boat under sail and stopped her. The boat belonged to a farm called Gilliland’s. Aboard was found a man with a pass from Major Charles Preston, British commander at Fort St. Johns. Gilliland, under interrogation, said there was a man ashore with a pass from Carleton. Stewart took custody of both men. The next day both prisoners were sent to Crown Point under guard of three men at 0700. Liberty resumed her cruise toward Isle la Motte.300 She soon met heavy squalls and returned to anchor under Schuyler’s Island.301 On 2 August Stewart and Liberty’s Lieutenant of Marines went ashore with the boat to reconnoiter.302


Meanwhile, the long awaited Captain James Smith arrived to take command of the Enterprise, at Crown Point, on 1 August 1775. After a close examination Smith thought she was “of  Very Little use to the Service.” He was of the opinion that Enterprise could be taken by four bateaux with a swivel gun and ten men each. Smith made out a certificate to that effect and presented it to Schuyler the next day.303 Schuyler reported that Smith had arrived a few days previous from New York. He examined the sloop and indicated to Schuyler that she needed to be altered to put her in a “state of defense.” Schuyler had no carpenters to spare, unless he quit building boats, so he declined, whereupon Smith turned in a certificate stating that Enterprise was indefensible.304


By 2 August the prisoners from Gilliland’s had arrived at Fort Ticonderoga. The interrogation of one of the captured men, a farmer living at Fort St. Johns, named John Chatforth began at once. He reported he had left that post on 21 July, at which time the British had picketed a square fort, with a double row of pickets, enclosing an acre of ground, with a breastwork inside the picket and dry ditches outside. They intended to flood the ditches however. Eight or ten cannon were mounted, with embrasures for more. The garrison was about 460 men, with a very few Canadians and a few Indians serving as scouts. To the north of the fort was a second picketed enclosure of the same size, but without any guns mounted. The British had seized some ship timber and frames at Chamby, from a Mr. Bell, and it was hauled down to Fort St. Johns. Two schooners were to be built, one of 55' on the keel, and one of 54'. Provisions were scarce in Canada, and more troops were expected. As soon as the schooners were completed, they were to sail up the lake.305


The interrogation of the second man, John Duguid, revealed that the British had landed between thirty and forty cannon at Chambly, but had not brought them to Fort St. Johns yet. The British were busy hauling the framed ship timbers from Chambly to Fort St. Johns, using between thirty and forty carriages in the work, which Duguid thought would be finished by about 25 July. The vessels were to be laid down between the two fortifications. One was to be between 53' and 54' feet long, the other between 55' and 56'. Each was to mount sixteen cannon, mostly 12-pounders. Duguid thought there were fifty to sixty carpenters working on the vessels.306 This was serious news for the weak American forces.


Liberty weighed anchor at 0800 on 3 August and sailed from the southwest end to the northwest end of the lake, to a place called the “Frenchman’s House.” Landing with the Lieutenant of Marines and a sergeant, Stewart met Captain Remember Baker there. Baker had been out on a scout and had picked up information: the two schooners would be ready to sail by mid-August. They were 52' on the keel, mounting sixteen guns besides swivels. The French and Indian informants showed the Americans a place on the lake where the channel was very narrow and ran close inshore, a place to fortify to stop the British vessels. Captain Stewart, after consulting Baker, thought it best to bring this information to Schuyler. There was a “fine Gale of Wind,” so Liberty sailed for Crown Point.307 Liberty arrived at Crown Point at 1600 on 4 August.308


On 12 August Private (or Sergeant) Peter Griffin, and Lieutenant Watson, both of Easton’s Regiment, departed from Crown Point, on a hair-raising sortie to scout down the lake. On the 20th the two met the Liberty, with Captain Remember Baker309 and Major John Brown aboard.310 Baker selected Griffin for a scout into Canada.311


The next day Griffin landed with an Indian at dawn from the Liberty, below Wind Mill Point on the west side of the Sorel River. Griffin proceeded up the Sorel to within 500 paces of the fortification at Fort St. Johns, arriving at 1800. He observed four or five cannon mounted on the south intrenchment, facing the river, two vessels on the stocks, fifty to sixty feet long, pitched black and planked up to the gunwales. Griffin departed from Fort St. Johns at daybreak on the 22nd. He evaded an Indian patrol, and spent the night at a friendly inhabitant’s house. He managed to get back aboard the Liberty on the morning of the 23rd.312


While Griffin was up the Sorel, Liberty under Brown’s direction, sounded the lake channel near the point below Windmill Point. Brown is of the “opinion that a stand may be made there.” Brown noted that, if the Army were not ready to advance, then a plan of blocking the lake must be adopted before the British vessels were finished.313


With the Liberty at anchor north of Isle La Motte, Griffin reported to Brown. The two vessels were nearly completed, the hulls were finished up to the gunwales and the masts were preparing. The vessels appeared large. Brown thought they would be finished in a week or ten days. The British workers were busy, working til after dark. Brown noted that “These Vessels when on the Lake will effectually Command it, & the Expedition is up for this Year...” These vessels could “Sweep this Lake in its present Condition.” Brown urged the quick advance of the Army into Canada, Brown offering to lead the way. He also reported two regiments were coming to the army by way of the Cohos and the Onion River.314


Before Griffin had got aboard, Captain Remember Baker left the Liberty to canoe down the Sorel toward Isle aux Noix, to pick up Griffin. Baker was chased off by Indian patrols. After reporting Griffin was dispatched to Crown Point, where he arrived on 24 August. The next day he was at Fort Ticonderoga, reporting to Montgomery personally.315 Liberty dropped off Baker with a few scouts and then sailed for Crown Point.316 But Baker had pushed his luck too far. About 25 August he met one of Carleton’s Indian patrols. In a skirmish two Indians were killed but so was Baker.317


9. Buildup at Fort Ticonderoga, July-August 1775


Schuyler, at Fort Ticonderoga, reported to Congress again on 27 July. He thought an immediate movement to Fort St. Johns was required, but he did not have enough boat lift to carry more than 550 men and he had every boat on the lake in camp. Nor had all the stores and supplies arrived. Schuyler had only three tons of powder. The entrenching tools were needed to dig approaches. Schuyler was short of supplies, but would not delay on that account.318


By the end of July Schuyler had built some thirty bateaux. In addition two flat-bottomed boats, measuring forty feet by twelve feet had been constructed on Lake George. William Gilliland’s sawmill at Willsboro had provided 5000 board feet of lumber by early August, and Gilliland had pledged to double or triple that amount for the American fleet.319


Schuyler knew he needed more boats and more fighting vessels too. On 31 July construction began on a sixty-foot long open boat. Schuyler hoped it would lift two hundred men. She would take a week to build, when he would start another.320 This was the first “gondola” on the lake.


On 2 August Schuyler requested that Congress send up a number of good ship carpenters, if Congress wanted vessels of equal or superior force to the British ones building at Fort St. Johns. He notes that, even if built, they will be of little use except as transports, due to the lack of powder.321 The next day Schuyler, in a letter to Governor Trumbull, reported more provisions had arrived and that there was now a sufficiency of that item. He continued to build boats, but the reports of enemy naval strength, if true, would prevent the attack on Fort St. Johns. Even if he had comparable vessels they would be of little use, for after issuing powder to the troops there would remain only a ton. Sickness had broken out in the army, 92 of 500 being on the sick list.322


On the 6th Schuyler reported to John Hancock. He passed along the current intelligence from Liberty’s cruise, noted that nearly one hundred men were sick, out of five hundred, and commented on his efforts to introduce regularity into the distribution of provisions. Schuyler thought he would have enough boats to transport his army to Fort St. Johns (1200 men only), “if I should be ordered there,” before Hancock replied. Schuyler noted that boats built on the lake were very bad that the labor was largely lost. If Congress intended Schuyler to build “a Naval force superior to that of the Enemy,” he must keep what carpenters he had and obtain more, some “good” ones. Schuyler thought it necessary to build more boats.323 Meanwhile, one article was supplied: on 10 August Philadelphia forwarded 2200 pounds of gunpowder to Schuyler.324


On the 23rd the two gondolas (the sixty foot boats) were completed at Fort Ticonderoga. These sloop-rigged325 vessels were named Hancock and Schuyler.326 They were flat-bottomed boats capable of mounting five 12-pounders each, but only one gun was mounted because of a shortage of carriages.327 Since this is the first mention of gondolas, or (gundalows, gundaloes) it is necessary to explain this peculiar craft, so often used on the lake. These vessels were easily built and easily handled by inexperienced sailors. They were a type of small craft and ranged from fifty to sixty-four feet in length and from sixteen to twenty feet in beam. All were of the open boat type, although some had bulwarks and raised quarterdecks. A forecastle deck usually supported a heavy gun, with two to four smaller guns in broadside. The largest specimens could carry from six to ten guns. All were fitted for sweeps and some had an outside keel to help in beating to windward, but most were not fitted with one. The larger ones, with a quarterdeck, used the space underneath for quarters. The smaller ones rigged a tent or awning for quarters, or slept the crew in the open.328


The American gondolas were double ended: sharp at bow and stern, and usually were flat-bottomed, without rocker or deadrise.329 The gondola usually had a single mast, mounting a square course and topsail: a few had a single jib flying from the stern. Some had a bowsprit and one or two head sails. Gondolas were heavily sparred and canvassed for their size, being very stiff vessels.330


There were a number of other American vessels on the lake by now. There were the Liberty and Enterprise. There were two large bateaux armed with swivel guns. Other flat-bottomed boats and bateaux were in service, including one captured at Skenesborough back in May.331


Schuyler, down at Albany for a conference, now reported that he had enough boat lift capacity to move 1300 men with twenty days provision, and “we shall very soon make an attempt on St. Johns.”332 This event was to come even sooner than Schuyler expected.


On 25 August, while Schuyler was still at Albany, attending an Indian conference, Montgomery resolved on an immediate advance to prevent the British vessels getting into the lake, acting on Griffin’s and Brown’s intelligence. Montgomery notified Schuyler by express. Two days later Schuyler received Montgomery’s notice.333 The first phase of the lake campaign was over; the second phase had begun.



1 Alden, American Revolution, 46 and note

2 Ward, War of the Revolution, 64

3 Boatner, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution, 116-117

4 Bird, Harrison, Attack on Quebec: The American Invasion of Canada, 1775, Oxford University Press, New York: 1968, 5

5 Bird, Attack, 6-7; Bellico, Sail and Steam, 116

6 Alden, American Revolution, 46

7 Bellico, Sail and Steam, 118. However, the two latter names seem to be a misreading of the original sources.

8 NDAR, “John Brown to the Massachusetts Committee of Correspondence,” I, 161-162 and 162 note

9 Alden, American Revolution, 46-47

10 Alden, American Revolution, 45-46 and 46 note

11 Alden, American Revolution, 47. Date in Boatner, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution, 1101.

12 Alden, American Revolution, 47

13 Boatner, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution, 25

14 Ward, War of the Revolution, 65

15 Alden, American Revolution, 47

16 Alden, American Revolution, 47

17 NDAR, “Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman in Pittsfield to an Officer at Cambridge, dated May 4, 1775,” I, 278

18 Ward, War of the Revolution, 66

19 NDAR, “Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman in Pittsfield to an Officer at Cambridge, dated May 4, 1775,” I, 278

20 Ward, War of the Revolution, 66

21 NDAR, “Edward Mott to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,” I, 315-317

22 NDAR, “Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman in Pittsfield to an Officer at Cambridge, dated May 4, 1775,” I, 278

23 Ward, War of the Revolution, 66

24 Alden, American Revolution, 47

25 NDAR, “Edward Mott to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,” I, 315-317; “Rivington’s New York Gazetteer, Thursday, May 18, 1775,” I, 358-359

26 Ward, War of the Revolution, 66

27 Alden, American Revolution, 47

28 Bellico, Sails and Steam, 117

29 NDAR, “Minutes of the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 250

30 NDAR, “Captain Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 250

31 NDAR, “Minutes of the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 262-263 and 263 note

32 NDAR, “Minutes of the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 262-263 and 263 note

33 Ward, War of the Revolution, 66

34 NDAR, “Edward Mott to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,” I, 315-317

35 Ward, War of the Revolution, 66

36 NDAR, “Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman in Pittsfield to an Officer at Cambridge, dated May 4, 1775,” I, 278

37 NDAR, “Edward Mott to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,” I, 315-317

38 NDAR, “Massachusetts Committee of Safety to Colonel Benedict Arnold,” I, 267

39 NDAR, “Pay Roll of the Continental Sloop Enterprise,” I, 797 and note. This payroll covers land service too.

40 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 834-835

41 NDAR, “Edward Mott to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,” I, 315-317

42 NDAR, “Abraham Yates, Chairman of the Committee of the City of Albany, to the Committee of One Hundred of New York,” I, 320

43 NDAR, “Edward Mott to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,” I, 315-317

44 Ward, War of the Revolution, 66

45 NDAR, “Edward Mott to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,” I, 315-317

46 Ward, War of the Revolution, 67

47 Boatner, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution, 1101

48 NDAR, “Edward Mott to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,” I, 315-317

49 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 312-313

50 NDAR, “Ethan Allen’s Account of the Taking of Ticonderoga,” I, 304-305

51 NDAR, “Colonel Ethan Allen to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,” I, 313-314

52 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 312-313

53 Ward, War of the Revolution, 67

54 NDAR, “Ethan Allen’s Account of the Taking of Ticonderoga,” I, 304-305

55 Ward, War of the Revolution, 67

56 Ward, War of the Revolution, 68

57 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 312-313

58 Ward, War of the Revolution, 68-69

59 NDAR, “Ethan Allen’s Account of the Taking of Ticonderoga,” I, 304-305

60 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 312-313

61 NDAR, “Edward Mott to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,” I, 315-317

62 NDAR, “Committee of War at Ticonderoga to the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, Watertown,” I, 304

63 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 312-313

64 NDAR, “J. Sparding to the Provincial Congress of New York,” I, 588

65 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 312-313

66 NDAR, “Colonel Ethan Allen to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,” I, 313-314

67 NDAR, “Colonel Ethan Allen to the Committee of the City of Albany,” I, 314

68 NDAR, “Ethan Allen to Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of Connecticut,” I, 319; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 330

69 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 828

70 Eleazer Oswald was born in England about 1755, emigrated to America in 1770, and served as a private in the Lexington alarm. Boatner, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution, 820. Bird, Navies in the Mountains, 132 says he was a merchant skipper.

71 NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” I, 312 and note

72 NDAR, “Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman in New York, May 22 [1775],” I, 504

73 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367; “Extract of a Letter  From Crown Point, May 19,” 1, 367 and note

74 Smith, Marines in the Revolution, 24-26

75  Chapelle, American Sailing Navy, 112

76  Chapelle, American Sailing Navy, 113

77  Bird, Navies in the Mountains, 134

78 NDAR, “Journl kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” I, 327 and 330; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 330; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367

79 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 330; “Rivington’s New York Gazetteer, Thursday, May 18, 1775,” I, 358-359

80 Ward, War of the Revolution, 69. Ward says nine prisoners were captured.

81 Bird, Navies in the Mountains, 133

82  Lossing, Field Book of the American Revolutioni, 153-154 note

83  Bellico, Sails and Steam, 117

84 NDAR, “Ethan Allen to Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of Connecticut,” I, 319. Despite numerous references to Skene’s capture, he was not captured at Skenesborough. He was later taken, as a passenger, in Philadelphia.

85 NDAR, “Abraham Yates, Chairman of the Committee of the City of Albany, to the Committee of One Hundred of New York,” I, 320

86 NDAR, “Jesse Root to Silas Deane,” I, 528-529 and 529 note. These marines are known in USMC legend as the “Original Eight.”

87 NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” I, 327 and note; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367

88 Both men were merchant captains according to Bird, Navies in the Mountains, 132

89 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367

90 NDAR, “Journal Kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” I, 340 and note

91 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 330

92 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 330; “Extract of a Letter From Crown Point, May 19,” I, 367 and note

93 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 330

94 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 330

95 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367

96 NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” I, 327 and note; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367

97 NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” I, 330 and note

98 NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” I, 340 and note

99  NDAR, “Journal Kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” 1, 344 and note;  “Extract of a Letter From Crown Point, 19 May,” 1, 367

100  NDAR, “Journal Kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” 1, 344 and note

101  NDAR, “Extract of a Letter From Crown Point, 19 May,” 1, 367

102  NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” 1, 364-367

103  NDAR, “Journal Kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” 1, 344 and note

104  NDAR, “Extract of a Letter From Crown Point, 19 May,” 1, 367; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” 1, 364-367; “Journal Kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” 1, 344 and note

105  NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” 1, 358

106  NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” 1, 364-367

107  NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” 1, 358

108  NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” 1, 364-367

109  NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” 1, 358

110  Tjis vessel is known to some modern writers as George, others as George III. In fact, in the old documents she is unnamed and usually spoken of as “George’s sloop,” or the sloop of George III. To give her as probable a name as any we follow DANFS, IV, 108, with George.

111  Bird, Navies in the Mountains, 134-135

112 NDAR, New York Gazette, Monday, May 29, 1775,” I, 565

113 NDAR, “Extract of a Letter From Crown Point, May 19,” I, 367 and note; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Albany Committee of Safety,” I, 503-504 and 504 note

114 NDAR, “Extract of a Letter  From Crown Point, May 19,” I, 367 and note

115 NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” I, 358; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367

116 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367

117  Bird, Navies in the Mountains, 135

118 NDAR, “Extract of a Letter From Crown Point, May 19,” I, 367 and note; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Albany Committee of Safety,” I, 503-504 and 504 note

119 NDAR, “Extract of a Letter From Crown Point, May 19,” I, 367 and note; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 512-513 and 513 note; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Albany Committee of Safety,” I, 503-504 and 504 note

120 NDAR, New York Gazette, Monday, May 29, 1775,” I, 565

121 NDAR, New York Gazette, Monday, May 29, 1775,” I, 565

122 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367

123 NDAR, New York Gazette, Monday, May 29, 1775,” I, 565

124 NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” I, 358

125 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367

126 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 512-513 and 513 note

127 NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” I, 358

128 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367

129 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 512-513 and 513 note

130 NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” I, 358

131 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 512-513 and 513 note

132 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367

133 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 512-513 and 513 note

134 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367

135 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 512-513 and 513 note

136 NDAR, “Colonel Ethan Allen to the Merchants of Montreal,” I, 353

137 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 512-513 and 513 note

138 NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” I, 358

139 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 512-513 and 513 note

140 NDAR,”New York Gazette, Monday, May 29, 1775,” I, 565

141 NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” I, 358

142 NDAR, “Captain Benedict Arnold to Captain John Stephens,” I, 501-502; “New York Gazette, Monday, May 29, 1775,” I, 565

143 NDAR, “Captain Benedict Arnold to Captain John Stephens,” I, 501-502; “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 512-513 and 513 note; “New York Gazette, Monday, May 29, 1775,” I, 565

144 NDAR, “Extract of a Letter From Crown Point, May 19,” I, 367 and notes

145 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367

146 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 585-587

147 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 364-367

148  Bird, Navies in the Mountains, 136. According to Bird command of the Liberty went to a Captain Brown. However, Captain Jonathan Brown was sent to Massachusetts with a letter from Arnold on that date. NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” 1, 364-367

149  NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” 1, 364-367

150  NDAR, “Captain Benedict Arnold to Captain John Stephens,” 1, 501-502

151  NDAR, “Captain Benedict Arnold to Captain John Stephens,” 1, 501-502

152  NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Albany Committee of Safety,” 1, 503-504 and 504 note

153  NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” 1, 512-513 and 513 note

154  NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Albany Committee of Safety,” 1, 503-504 and 504 note

155 NDAR, “Pay Roll of the Continental Sloop Enterprise,” I, 797 and note

156 NDAR, “Captain Benedict Arnold to Captain John Stephens,” I, 501-502

157 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to Captain John Stephens,” I, 501-502

158 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Albany Committee of Safety,” I, 503-504 and 504 note

159 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 512-513 and 513 note

160 NDAR, “Isaac Low, Chairman of the Committee of One Hundred of New York, to Peyton Randolph, President of the Continental Congress,” I, 340

161 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 349-350

162 NDAR, “Journal of the Continental Congress,” I, 360; “Pennsylvania Packet, Monday, May 22, 1775,” I, 505-506

163 NDAR, “Journal of the Continental Congress,” I, 360

164 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 363

165 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 502

166 NDAR, “Committee of New York to Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of Connecticut,” I, 504-505 and 505 note

167 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of New York.” I, 514

168 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of New York,” I, 519-521

169 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of New York,” I, 529-532 and 532 note

170 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of New York,” I, 529-532 and 532 note

171 NDAR, “Jesse Root to Silas Deane,” I, 528-529 and 529 note

172 NDAR, “William Williams to the Connecticut Delegates in the Continental Congress,” I, 510-512

173 NDAR, “William Williams to the Connecticut Delegates in the Continental Congress,” I, 510-512

174 NDAR, “Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of Connecticut, to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,” I, 526-528

175 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 585-587

176 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 512-513 and 513 note

177 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 512-513 and 513 note

178 NDAR, “Journal kept by Eleazer Oswald on Lake Champlain,” I, 513

179 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 512-513 and 513 note

180 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Cambridge,” I, 512-513 and 513 note

181  NDAR, “Jesse Root to Silas Deane,” 1, 528-529 and 529 note

182 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 539. Arnold’s late information is dated “10th Inst.,” an impossible date, perhaps the 20th is meant.

183 NDAR, “Samuel Stringer, Chairman Pro. Tem. of the Committee of the City of Albany, to the Provincial Congress of New York,” I, 539-540

184 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of New York,” I, 540-541

185 NDAR, “Provincial Congress of Massachusetts to the Provincial Congress of New York,” I, 536-537

186 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 543

187 NDAR, “Provincial Congress of Massachusetts to Colonel Benedict Arnold,” I, 544

188 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 585-587

189 NDAR, “Committee of Safety of Massachusetts to Colonel Benedict Arnold,” I, 551

190 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 585-587

191 NDAR, “Colonel Ethan Allen to the Continental Congress,” I, 563-564

192 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 562-563

193 NDAR, “Colonel Ethan Allen to the Continental Congress,” I, 563-564

194 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Continental Congress,” I, 561-562 and 562 note

195 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 562-563

196 NDAR, “Colonel Ethan Allen to the Continental Congress,” I, 563-564

197 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Committee of Safety of Massachusetts,” I, 562

198 NDAR, “Colonel Ethan Allen to the Continental Congress,” I, 563-564

199 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Continental Congress,” I, 561-562 and 562 note

200 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” I, 562-563

201 NDAR, “Barnabas Deane to Silas Deane,” I, 589

202 NDAR, “Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of Connecticut, to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,” I, 560-561

203 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of New York,” I, 565

204 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 575

205 NDAR, “Colonel Joseph Henshaw to Colonel Benedict Arnold,” I, 579 and note

206 Alden, American Revolution, 48-49

207 NDAR, “Journal of the Continental Congress,” I, 580

208 NDAR, “Journal of the Continental Congress,” I, 590

209 NDAR, “Journal of the Continental Congress,” I, 590

210 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 585-587

211 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 585-587

212 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 585-587

213 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of New York,” I, 589

214 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of New York,” I, 589

215 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of New York,” I, 603 and note

216 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of New York,” I, 603 and note

217 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of New York,” I, 625-628

218 NDAR, I, 592, document illustration

219 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 594-595

220 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 630

221 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 609

222 NDAR, “Walter Spooner to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 807-808

223 NDAR, “Pay Roll of the Continental Sloop Enterprise,” I, 797 and note

224 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Continental Congress,” I, 671-673

225 NDAR, “Proclamation of Sir Guy Carleton, Governor of Canada,” I, 639-640

226 NDAR, “Colonel Ethan Allen to the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 642-643

227 NDAR, “Colonel Ethan Allen and Others to the Continental Congress, Philadelphia,” I, 646-647

228 NDAR, “Colonel Ethan Allen and Others to the Continental Congress, Philadelphia,” I, 646-647

229 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 828

230 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 661 and note

231 NDAR, “Walter Spooner to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 807-808

232 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 667-669

233 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 667-669

234 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 680

235 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Continental Congress,” I, 671-673

236 NDAR, “Journal of the Continental Congress,” I, 688-689

237 Schuyler was born in 1733, the descendent of one of the most venerable and rich of the New York Dutch families. He had an excellent education, served as a Captain in the French and Indian War, and fought at Lake George on 8 September 1755. Schuyler then became a logistics officer. He suffered from chronic attacks of rheumatic gout. He established a military depot at Fort Edward in 1755, served under Bradstreet in 1756 and resigned in 1757. In 1758 he served as a deputy commissary with the grade of Major, and took part in the unsuccessful attack on Fort Ticonderoga and the capture of Fort Frontenac. In 1759-1760 he operated from his birthplace, Albany, provisioning Amherst’s forces. Settlement of his father’s estate in 1763 endowed him with thousands of acres of land in the Mohawk and Hudson valleys. Schuyler was elected to the colonial assembly in 1768 and became an ardent patriot, although opposed to the most radical of the patriot party. He served as a commissioner in the boundary dispute with Massachusetts and New Hampshire over the New Hampshire Grants (Vermont) area, earning intense dislike in New England. When major generals were named he became the fourth ranking officer in the Continental Army. Boatner, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution, 991

238 NDAR, “Samuel Stringer, Chairman of the Albany Committee, to the Continental Congress,” I, 736-737

239 NDAR, “Samuel Stringer, Chairman of the Albany Committee, to the Continental Congress,” I, 736-737

240 NDAR, “Report of the Committee Sent to Ticonderoga and Crown Point by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 825-827

241 NDAR, “Captain Edward Mott to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 829-830

242 NDAR, “Walter Spooner to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 807-808

243 NDAR, “Walter Spooner to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 807-808; “Report of the Committee Sent to Ticonderoga and Crown Point by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 825-827

244 NDAR, “Walter Spooner to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 807-808; “Report of the Committee Sent to Ticonderoga and Crown Point by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 825-827

245 NDAR, “Massachusetts Committee to Colonel Benedict Arnold,” I, 743; “Report of the Committee Sent to Ticonderoga and Crown Point by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 825-827

246 NDAR, “Report of the Committee Sent to Ticonderoga and Crown Point by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 825-827

247 NDAR, “Walter Spooner to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 807-808

248 NDAR, “Report of the Committee Sent to Ticonderoga and Crown Point by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 825-827

249 William Satterlee was Lieutenant William Satterlee of Captain Herrick’s company of Arnold’s regiment. NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 834-835.

250 NDAR, “Report of the Committee Sent to Ticonderoga and Crown Point by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 825-827

251 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Massachusetts Committee,” I, 748

252 NDAR, “Captain Edward Mott to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 829-830

253 NDAR, “Committee From the Massachusetts Provincial Congress to the New York Provincial Congress,” I, 752-753

254 NDAR, “Walter Spooner to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 807-808

255 NDAR, “Captain Edward Mott to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 829-830

256 NDAR, “Committee From the Massachusetts Provincial Congress to the New York Provincial Congress,” I, 752-753

257 NDAR, “Captain Edward Mott to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 829-830

258 NDAR, “Report of the Committee Sent to Ticonderoga and Crown Point by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 825-827

259 NDAR, “Report of the Committee Sent to Ticonderoga and Crown Point by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 825-827

260 NDAR, “Captain Edward Mott to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 829-830

261 NDAR, “Committee From the Massachusetts Provincial Congress to the New York Provincial Congress,” I, 752-753

262 NDAR, “Committee From the Massachusetts Provincial Congress to the New York Provincial Congress,” I, 752-753; “Walter Spooner to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 807-808

263 NDAR, “Journal of the Continental Congress,” I, 744

264 NDAR, “Journal of the Continental Congress,” I, 763-764

265 NDAR, “Journal of the Continental Congress,” I, 763-764

266 NDAR, “John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress, to Major General Philip Schuyler,” I, 771-772

267 Force, III, 3

268 NDAR, “Committee From the Massachusetts Provincial Congress to the New York Provincial Congress,” I, 752-753

269 NDAR, “Walter Spooner to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 807-808

270 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to Colonel Benjamin Hinman at Ticonderoga,” I, 769-771

271 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to the Continental Congress,” I, 777-778

272 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress,” I, 786-787

273 Jeremiah Halsey was a native of Preston, Connecticut. [Bird, Navies in the Mountains, 138] He had been among the original Connecticut men participating in the capture of the lake forts in May and escorted the prisoners to Hartford. As later events would show Halsey was a troublemaker.

274 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress,” I, 988-989 and 989 note

275 Bird, Navies in the Mountains, 138

276 Bird, Navies in the Mountains, 144

277 NDAR, “Pay Roll of the Continental Sloop Enterprise,” I, 797 and note

278 NDAR, “Journal kept on board the Continental Schooner Liberty,” I, 1042

279 NDAR, “Journal of the Continental Congress,” I, 797-798

280 NDAR, “John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress, to Major General Philip Schuyler,” I, 798

281 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress,” I, 809-810

282 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Continental Congress,” I, 862-863

283 NDAR, “Report of the Committee Sent to Ticonderoga and Crown Point by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 825-827

284 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 834-835

285 NDAR, “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” I, 834-835

286 NDAR, “Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of Connecticut, to Major General Philip Schuyler,” I, 829

287 NDAR, “Captain Edward Mott to Governor Jonathan Trumbull,” I, 829-830

288 NDAR, “Colonel Benjamin Hinman to Major General Philip Schuyler,” I, 837

289 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress,” I, 860-862

290 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to the New York Provincial Congress,” I, 860

291 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to the New York Provincial Congress,” I, 860

292 NDAR, “Colonel Benedict Arnold to the Continental Congress,” I, 862-863

293 NDAR, “Minutes of the New York Committee of Safety,” I, 888-889

294 NDAR, “Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of Connecticut, to Major General Philip Schuyler,” I, 901

295 NDAR, “Journal of the Continental Congress,” I, 902

296 NDAR, “Journal of the Continental Congress,” I, 937-938

297 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to Benjamin Franklin,” I, 1217

298 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress,” I, 988-989 and 989 note

299 NDAR, “Certificate of Commodore William Douglas,” II, 1231

300 NDAR, “Journal Kept on Board the Continental Schooner Liberty,” I, 1012

301 NDAR, “Journal Kept on Board the Continental Schooner Liberty,” I, 1023

302 NDAR, “Journal kept on board the Continental Schooner Liberty,” I, 1042

303 NDAR, “Certificate of Captain James Smith,” I, 1044

304 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress,” I, 1042

305 NDAR, “Deposition of John Chatfort before Major General Philip Schuyler,” I, 1042-1044

306 NDAR, “Deposition of John Duguid at Ticonderoga,” I, 1044

307 NDAR, “Journal kept on board the Continental Schooner Liberty,” I, 1055

308 NDAR, “Journal kept on board the Continental schooner Liberty,” I, 1042

309 NDAR, “Examination of Private Peter Griffin,” I, 1231-1232

310 NDAR, “Major John Brown to Brigadier General Richard Montgomery,” I, 1215-1217

311 NDAR, “Examination of Private Peter Griffin,” I, 1231-1232

312 NDAR, “Examination of Private Peter Griffin,” I, 1231-1232

313 NDAR, “Major John Brown to Brigadier General Richard Montgomery,” I, 1215-1217

314 NDAR, “Major John Brown to Brigadier General Richard Montgomery,” I, 1215-1217

315 NDAR, “Examination of Private Peter Griffin,” I, 1231-1232; “Major General Philip Schuyler to John Hancock,” II, 43-45

316 NDAR, “Major John Brown to Brigadier General Richard Montgomery,” I, 1215-1217

317 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to the Commissioners for Indian Affairs in the Northern Department,” I, 1276

318 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress,” I, 988-989 and 989 note

319  Bellico, Sail and Steam, 121

320 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to the New York Provincial Congress,” I, 1023

321 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress,” I, 1042

322 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of Connecticut,” I, 1055 and note

323 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress,” I, 1078-1079

324 NDAR, “Benjamin Franklin to George Washington,” I, 1168-1169

325  Bellico, Sails and Steam, 121

326  Smith, Marines in the Revolution, 59

327 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to Benjamin Franklin,” I, 1217

328 Chapelle, American Sailing Navy, 101

329 Chapelle, American Sailing Navy, 101

330 Chapelle, American Sailing Navy, 102

331 Bellico, Sails and Steam, 121

332 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to Benjamin Franklin,” I, 1217

333 NDAR, “Major General Philip Schuyler to John Hancock,” II, 43-45


Revised 6 August 2014 © awiatsea.com